Tag Archives: Brahminism

Archival Note

Published in Dalit Voice (Vol. 29, Issue No. 03, 01/02/2010), this essay by V. T. Rajshekar examines Hinduism through the question of caste. He traces caste divisions to the Purusha Sukta and the Bhagavad Gita, then turns to the Manusmriti and its treatment of Brahmins, Sudras and women.

Rajshekar connects these religious texts to the oppression of Dalits and cites accounts of violence against Untouchables alongside condemnations of caste from writers and public figures. His argument leads to a direct question: if caste is part of the religious order Rajshekar identifies as Hinduism, can Hinduism exist without caste?

The essay closes by putting that question to the Hindu believer featured in the film that prompted Rajshekar’s article. How can Hindu faith be reconciled with the caste system? And if caste is rejected, what does that mean for the religious traditions that Rajshekar argues have sustained it?

Read the full piece here

British Anthropologist Details Barbarity of Hinduism

“Revelations: How do you know god exists”, is a film by Anthony Thomas (Channel 4). I saw this film on Aug. 16, 2009. I was particularly interested in what the Hindus had to say. I lived in India for 15 years and found their belief system very confusing. The Hindus as well as the others interviewed failed to show us how he knew god exists.

PART-1

The caste system & origins of Hinduism:

Hinduism is based on myth. Seven rishis overheard “wisdom” being spoken by the gods. This wisdom they passed on to mankind as the four Vedas:

1. Rig Veda
2. Yajur Veda
3. Sama Veda
4. Atharva Veda

The Rig Veda is our principal concern. It is a composition of 1,028 poems. But more of this later.

HINDU & GREEK GODS

33 crore gods:

According to Lord Winstone (April 17, 2006), the Hindus have about 330,000,000 gods. Shiva, one of the main gods, has 1,008 epithets. Most deities have consorts: Shiva’s wife is Parvati, Vishnu’s wife is Lakshmi and Brahma’s wife is Sarasvati. Mention must be made of two other important gods: Durga and Kali. Sitala is the goddess of smallpox. And the Hindu deity Devagana, it is believed, lives in the anus. And so on.

The Greeks also believed in gods and goddesses. The Greek philosophers found that the gods and goddesses resembled mortals too much and the “myths were nothing but human notions”.

Xenophanes who lived about the year 570 BC was the exponent of this view. There followed developments from a mythological mode to one based on experience and reason. The aim of Greek philosophy was to find natural rather than supernatural explanations for natural processes. The Greek gods and goddesses were then relegated to the realms of fiction.

But the Hindus, on the other hand, continue to believe in their gods and goddesses to this day. The Hindu belief that human beings are born unequal is based on a Vedic hymn called Purusha Sukta found in the fourth veda, the Rig Veda.

According to the Purusha Sukta, the social divisions into which all human beings fall are:

(1) Brahmins, the highest caste, (2) Kshatriyas, the warrior caste, (3) Vaisyas, the merchant caste and (4) Sudras, the working caste.

GOD CREATED CASTE SYSTEM

Outside this demarcation based on strict hereditary lines are the outcastes or Untouchables, who do not belong to any caste at all. They are called Dalits today. It was further confirmed by God Krishna in the Bhagavad Gita (4.13):

The fourfold caste was created by me by the different distribution of guna and karma.

It was finally codified by someone called Manu, the greatest lawgiver.

Who was this Manu?

Manu was born directly of the god Brahma and was hermaphrodite. The human race began from Manu and his family. (Romila Thaper: A History of India, p. 28).

HINDU LAWS OF MANU

Gidoomal and Thomson on p. 17 of their book, A Way of Life, say:

Manu represents the beginning. A semi-divine mythical creature; he is the first man, the first king of India, the first to light the sacrificial fire and the first and the greatest lawgiver.

Every Hindu man and woman is expected to follow the laws of Manu which came to be called Varnashrama Dharma or Manusmriti. They were written down about 200 BC. Hindus follow the laws of Manu to the letter even to this day. And what are some of the laws set by Manu for Hindus to follow?

Here are some taken at random:

(1) The Brahmins are the highest caste. They are the gods among humans.

(2) The drum, the illiterate, the low caste, animals and women must be beaten to make them fit.

(3) A woman must never be independent.

(4) The Brahmin is holy and has a claim to veneration even if he commits shameful deeds.

(5) A Brahmin is born as the highest on earth, the lord of all created things. Whatever exists in the world is the property of the Brahmin on account of the excellence of his origin. The Brahmin is indeed entitled to it all.

(6) The lord has prescribed only one occupation for Sudras (the lowest caste). They must perform service without malice to the other three castes.

(7) Those who educate Sudras will go to hell. A Sudra is unfit to receive education. The upper varnas or castes should not impart education or give advice to a Sudra. Violators will go to hell, called Asamvritta.

(8) If a Sudra (low caste) listens to a recitation of the Vedas (Hindu holy books), his ears shall be filled with tin or lac. If he recites Vedic texts, his tongue shall be cut. Only the Brahmins are entitled to receive the teachings imparted in the Vedas.

ATROCITIES AGAINST DALITS

It is difficult to credit the misanthropic effusions as law to this man who, it is said, was the son of Brahma, the supreme god. No wonder Indian women in 2000 AD

“publicly burned copies of the Manusmriti declaring that the text was misogynistic” (Introducing Hinduism, Lall & Von Lodon, p. 30).

Then there are millions and millions of people in India who have no caste at all. They are without caste because of sins committed by them in a previous incarnation. They are called outcastes or Untouchables. Today they are referred to as Dalits.

The effect of Manu on the outcastes has been devastating. From the time they are born till they die they suffer discrimination and humiliation at every turn of their lives.

GOD ORDERED HINDUS TO KILL DALITS

They have no redress. Here are a few examples of atrocities chosen at random which are committed against the Untouchables:

(1) 1969: India: A Million Mutinies Now by V. S. Naipaul (Viking): “In 1969, 40 Untouchables (Harijans) were burnt alive in a hut.”

(2) April 14, 1992: Commemorating the birthday of Dr. Ambedkar: “20 houses belonging to Untouchables were burnt at Kadalur village (80 km from Madras).” Reported by Henry Thiagaraj in The Wounded Society.

(3) June 18, 2000: The London Observer. “A picture showing a village of low castes (Untouchables) being massacred by high caste thugs in Bihar, India.”

(4) March 30, 2003: The Guardian: “A young lower caste woman was set on fire and burned to death yesterday by the upper caste father of the man she accused of raping her.”

(5) Dec. 16, 2005: Dalit Voice (magazine, p. 9). Gohana (Haryana) incident in Aug. 2005 when 60 Untouchable houses were burnt with police looking on.

(6) 2006: Indian National Bureau of Crime report. 27,007 crimes had been committed against Dalits. Many go unreported (See box):

In 1999, William Dalrymple, reviewing Robert Deliege’s book, The Untouchables of India, says in the London Sunday Times:

“Hindus actually believe god has authorised atrocities to be committed against these Untouchables.”

UNIVERSALLY CONDEMNED

Never in any part of this wide, wide world, whether savage or civilised, is systematic murder of human beings given such divine approval, except in India. Dalrymple goes on to say in the same review:

“In many high caste-dominated villages no Untouchable is allowed to ride a bicycle, sit down or even wear shoes in the presence of a high caste Hindu… Reported incidents of serious violence against Untouchables run at about 9,000 cases annually and this is the tip of the iceberg”.

The caste system of which untouchability is the indispensable part is integral to Hinduism.

‘….those whose conduct has been evil will quickly attain evil birth, the birth of a dog, the birth of a hog, or the birth of a Chandala (Untouchable).

Chandogya, translated by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and quoted by Pratima Bowes in her The Hindu Religious Tradition (p. 57).

The caste system and especially untouchability is universally condemned.

(1) Dr. Karan Singh, a leading Hindu thinker, in his Essays on Hinduism, quoted by Gidoomal & Thomson (p. 9), described the ill-treatment of Untouchables “over the centuries as a standing disgrace”.

(2) Pratima Bowes, The Hindu Religious Tradition (p. 17): The opinion (is) often expressed that the caste system is the centre of the Hindu religion and that the breakdown of this system means the end of this religion.

(3) Caspar Melville, editor of the New Humanist, Nov. 2005 (p. 19), is “against the caste system, the subordination of women and the invested power of the Brahmin”.

(4) Buddha to Manmohan Singh: The caste system has been condemned by writers and reformers from Buddha, Akbar, Mahatma Phule, Periyar, Gora, Tilak, Guru Nanak, Mahavira, Tukaram, Ram Mohan Roy, the Bhakti movement of Southern India to Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India, and countless others.

(5) Jawaharlal Nehru in Glimpses of World History (p. 112) says: “The caste system had the seeds of decay in it. It was based on perpetuating inequality and injustice and any such attempt was bound to fail in the end. No sound and stable society can be built upon the basis of inequality and injustice or on the exploitation of one class or group by another.”

BLEAK FUTURE OF HINDUISM

I give you three sources:

(1) Loon and Lall: Introducing Hinduism (p. 127):

As knowledge of India grows around the world: Bollywood, Indian fashions, Indian classical music, tandoori cooking and India’s famed gurus Hinduism will come under increasing scrutiny.

On p. 161, they go on to say:

Secular Indians and many others with a humanist vision think of the future of India as bleak.

(2) Ram Gidoomal & Robin Thomson in A Way of Life, (p. 150) say:

Whoever is in power, the tensions over caste and class will continue.

(3) Nirad Chaudry in his Preface to Hinduism (p. XI) says:

I have lost faith in the tenets of Hinduism, indeed in all established religions long ago.

CONCLUSION

Hinduism without the caste system is like Hamlet without the Prince.

I would like to ask the Hindu believer in the film wrapped in saffron robes and daubed in symbols of Hindu piety how he could reconcile his Hindu faith without the caste system.

Say what you will about the CJP protests against the NEET paper leak, everyone has already said that the immediate demands are not enough to change the education system. Education scholars are more likely to tell you about the 5-point charter submitted by the CJP to the Government of India. But one class of discourse generators is rattled by the protests themselves, or has been looking for an opportunity to vent its pre-existing frustrations or biases and has now found the perfect one . This is the oppressed castes’ general status and their tiresome, repeated, annoying rant against reservation.

This includes someone fabricating a fake post by actor Vijay Varma about his one non-reserved category friend suffering in some educational institution, which the pro-protest actor quickly said he had never posted. His acting in the anti-Mandal movement film Hurdang alongside Sunny Kaushal, however, may not have made his supposed stance difficult to believe had the post been genuine. Whether he posted it or not, and whether he believes the logic underneath that post, are different questions.

Mrunal Thakur, another actor, apparently posted a story on her Instagram account suggesting that the key moment that changed the game for everyone during these protests was NEET aspirant Harsh Dubey questioning the dominant narrative around the protests, arguing that the focus on the paper leak has overshadowed other longstanding issues in medical admissions. This was apparently a clip from a conversation with NDTV’s Shiv Aroor, where Dubey said questions around reservation policy and the difficulties faced by general category students also deserve public attention. Whether Mrunal Thakur will also come out and deny posting this is a matter of no one’s concern. Bollywood celebrities have shown their political illiteracy and general inhumanity more than once.

But this idea that neither the BJP nor the CJP wants to touch reservation, and that this is what led to the compromise, is one of those Savarna delusions burdened with so many argumentative flaws that a sane mind can hardly engage with it. To begin with, despite its classist and meritocratic articulation of the protests, the CJP does not appear to be opposed to reservation, partly reflected in its use of Ambedkarite symbolism, whether sincere or strategic. One also forgets that the BJP is a heterogeneous party with multiple caste groups and not simply Brahmins and other general category persons. There is no consensus on this question even within the Hindutva fold, something evident from the raita vs. trad debates that have long existed within their own ideological circles. To treat a single interview, one that merely regurgitates the most banal opinion circulating on the Savarna reactionary internet, as having played any pivotal role in shaping the protests is fantasy writing in its purest form.

But what is up with the casteist Savarnas? In a protest that brought together people from the non-protesting middle classes and celebrities, wherein status and privilege are also disproportionately held by oppressor castes, what has made the casteist Savarnas launch into their regular rant with great vigour? Are Savarnas simply waiting for any needle to move so they can carry their anti-reservation agenda? Are they simply incapable of shutting up for once?

Why, then, does every major public mobilisation touching education or even employment seem to invite an anti-reservation chorus from casteist Savarnas? The answer is not that reservation is secretly the central issue every time, like the Dubeys make it out to be. It is that reservation has become the preferred language through which sections of the Savarna public interpret almost every institutional crisis. Whenever a crisis emerges in education or public recruitment, reservation is summoned as the familiar explanation, even when it has little to do with the event itself. It is less a response to the facts before them than a political reflex.

This reflex performs an ideological function. It redirects public anger away from institutions and towards beneficiaries of affirmative action. A paper leak points towards failures of governance, regulation, corruption, examination agencies, and political accountability. None of these explanations preserve the moral authority of the existing Brahminical social order. Reservation, on the other hand, offers an already available narrative; and if Savarna public discourse has shown anything, it is that they love readily available labour, intellectual and otherwise. The next generation of casteists also lack imagination and will rely on the intellectual dis-labour of their Savarna forefathers.

These complaints are very vapid. They transform a structural failure into a grievance against redistributive and representational justice. Instead of asking why an examination system repeatedly fails millions of students, they ask who supposedly enjoys unfair advantages, even though the empirical facts reveal it is they who do. The institution escapes scrutiny because caste once again becomes framed as the problem only when it attempts to correct itself.

There is another reason why these moments are politically useful. Large protests produce so much uncertainty. They reopen public debate and create the possibility that questions long considered settled may be discussed again, especially now that social media has permitted everyone to have an opinion, for good and bad alike. For anti-reservation voices, this is an opportunity to attach their long-standing campaign to a movement that was never organised around their demands. They seek legitimacy through proximity of discourse. If enough people begin associating educational injustice with reservation rather than with state failure, the moment gets a new meaning.

This explains why Harsh Dubey’s interview came to acquire symbolic importance far beyond its actual place in the protests. It offered something many casteist Savarnas had been waiting for: an apparently articulate voice on national television through which they could restate arguments that have circulated for decades. Reservation disrupts the comforting belief that educational success reflects individual merit alone. Every conversation about admissions threatens to reopen the history of caste privilege that made merit appear natural in the first place. It is therefore unsurprising that even a movement against examination malpractice becomes, for some, another occasion to defend inherited advantages while presenting themselves as victims of an unjust system. The anti-reservation discourse surrounding the NEET protests tells us less about the movement than about the persistence of Savarna political common sense.

DalitThinkerToday is a Chartered Accountant by profession from Sangli, Maharashtra, who occasionally dabbles in thinking about politics when people in her oppressor-caste-majority office frustrate her. This is her pseudonym.

Archival Note

Published in Dalit Voice (Vol. 17, Issue No. 11, 16 April 1998), this essay enters debates over whether oppressed communities should relinquish their jati identities as part of the struggle against caste. Rajshekar argues that such demands misunderstand the relationship between caste hierarchy and the identities of historically oppressed communities, and questions whether calls for caste abolition are being applied equally across society.

Building his argument through a close reading of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s discussion of subcastes in Annihilation of Caste, Rajshekar contends that abolishing subcastes without dismantling the caste order would strengthen existing hierarchies. He therefore defends jati identity as a political question rather than treating it as an obstacle to emancipation.

The latter part of the essay draws on examples from Kerala to argue for separate representation within the Scheduled Castes and questions the classification of some communities under the reservation system. These assertions reflect Rajshekar’s interpretation and should not be read as established historical or legal fact.

Debate On “Jati” Identity

Subcaste abolition will strengthen Hindus & their caste system: Dr. Ambedkar

Our fake democrats, socialists, and other savarna outfits say: “Don’t ask about caste, don’t think about caste, and don’t talk about caste.” They repeat this mantra through their media, so much so that our innocent Dalits and BCs, who are the original victims of the caste system, have also started repeating this very same mantra. As they are the original victims of the caste system, they want to annihilate this devilish system. That is why, when the savarnas just whisper about destroying caste, the Dalits and BCs shout and scream. But why are the savarnas (Hindus), who are the beneficiaries of the caste system, advising only Dalits not to ask about caste, not to think about caste, and not to talk about caste? Are the Hindus willing to surrender the benefits of their caste system? Will they lead a movement, the ultimate result of which will destroy the power and prestige of the savarnas? This is a serious question that we Dalits and BCs have to answer.

CALL TO ELAVAS

No Pope can be a revolutionary. Similarly, no upper-caste man can be a revolutionary. The source of his income, power, prestige, and property is his caste system. So, can he think sincerely of destroying caste? Still, he talks about destroying caste. Why? This is where we become suspicious of his motive. While they call upon us to destroy our caste, what they actually mean is to destroy our ethnic identities, but not their caste system. When they say yes, they actually mean no, and vice versa.

Sree Narayana Guru, the liberator of the Elavas of Kerala, once said:

“Don’t ask about caste, don’t think about caste, and don’t talk about caste,” but his disciple, Sahodharan Ayyappan, the most revolutionary among the disciples of Sree Narayana Guru, reversed the statement and said: “We must always ask, think, and talk about caste.”

USE THORN TO REMOVE THORN

Caste is a thorn in the body of our society. So, we have to use another thorn to remove this thorn. After its removal, we will discard both the thorns. We have lost all human rights due to the caste system. So, we must use the very caste to regain our human rights. Only after we regain all human rights can we think of the removal of caste.

The fact is, we (SC/ST/BCs) have no caste because we are not Hindus. As the original inhabitants of India, what we have are our ethnic identities, which are not caste. Our Editor is right. We are not Hindus. So, destroying caste is not our duty. It is the duty of Hindus.

While they go on strengthening their own evil caste, why are they interested in destroying our ethnic identities like the Pulaya (Pariah), Elava, etc.? This is the puzzle. The fear of the upper castes is that our caste consciousness may help us regain our lost human rights. That is why they advise us to destroy our caste (ethnic identities). For this, they want to destroy our “subcastes” first, which are our ethnic identities. When they use the word “subcaste,” they make us think that we are a part of the Hindu caste system. They know that when we destroy our “subcaste,” we will lose our identity, join the Hindu caste system, and become their most obedient slaves.

INNOCENT DALITS MISLED

Some innocent Dalits also join this Hindu anti-caste campaign. For this, they want us to give up our “sub-caste” first and unite all subcastes in the name of “Dalit.” But can they destroy our identity? Never. Is it a true solution to get our human rights? No. Babasaheb says:

“But assuming that the fusion of subcastes is possible, what guarantee is there that the abolition of subcastes will necessarily lead to the abolition of castes? On the contrary, it may happen that process may stop with the abolition of subcastes. In that case, the abolition of subcastes will only help to strengthen the castes and make them more powerful and therefore far more mischievous. This remedy is, therefore, neither practicable nor effective and may easily prove to be a wrong remedy.” (W&S Vol. 1, p. 67).

Here Babasaheb says that if we abolish the subcastes, it will only help to strengthen the caste system and make the Hindus more powerful.

That means, when we strengthen the subcastes, the Hindu caste system will be destroyed and Hinduism itself will be abolished. That is why the savarnas call upon us to destroy our caste, meaning our ethnic identity, so that enslaving the entire indigenous Dalits and BCs becomes easy.

Some Dalits may have a genuine doubt that when we strengthen our subcaste identity, our people may get divided and fight, which in turn may destroy the very “Dalit concept” and “Dalit unity.” If our people are fighting each other even now on the basis of subcastes, it is not because of these subcastes but because they are Hinduised. They also think that they are Hindus. That is why each subcaste thinks that it is “superior” to other subcastes.

The fighting is not because of our subcastes but because of this wrong notion of superiority or inferiority that they copied from Hindus.

When we educate our people on Ambedkarism and Buddhism, remove the “Hindu mind” from their brains, they will know that we are all different but equal. Each community should recognise the human rights of other communities.

Strengthening the “caste identity,” without proper education, will be a dangerous thing for the Dalits and BCs.

KERALA SCENE

How do we ensure the human rights of each and every subcaste? The good old democratic principle is by giving adequate representation to every subcaste in every field. Otherwise, only the powerful subcaste will gain everything at the cost of other weaker subcastes.

In Kerala, the Pulaya subcaste is the biggest of all other Dalit subcastes. The word “Pulayan” means the owner of the land, peasant, intellectual, etc. Now, as they have lost all their lands, the meaning of the word Pulaya is landless people. They have become the most depressed class in Kerala. The Paraya (Pariah) subcaste is also depressed and landless. They were scavengers in Kerala. Pulaya, Paraya, Valluva, Nayadi, and Chakliyas are the most depressed classes in Kerala. All these subcastes have no adequate representation in the governance of the state.

In Kerala, there are 68 subcastes in the list of Scheduled Castes.

In this list, there are so many subcastes that should actually have been included in the BC list because they are socially and economically forward.

K.R. NARAYANAN IS FORWARD

Recently, I examined the reservation list of some educational institutions, especially in MBBS and Engineering. I could find hardly two or three SC candidates who actually hail from the most downtrodden people of Kerala, i.e., Pulaya, Paraya, Chakliya, etc. Even the MLAs and MPs from reserved constituencies are actually from the forward communities but included in the SC list. This is a serious injustice to the SCs.

President K.R. Narayanan belongs to the Parava community (not Pariah). This community should have been included in the BC list. The Paravas were not unseeables but only Untouchables like the Elavas of Kerala. The hereditary occupation of the Parava women was washing, and hence they were not Untouchables.

In my area, the Paravas behave like the savarnas and discriminate against the Pulayas, Parayas (Pariah), and other Untouchables. They will not even invite these communities to their marriages. There are so many communities in the SC list who behave like the savarnas. They treat the SC people with contempt. In a fight between an SC and a savarna, they side with the savarnas. And yet, they are having all facilities, including reservations, in the name of SC. But at the same time, they will not join us in our struggle for our human rights. The original SC people are fighting and fighting without gaining anything. The benefit goes to other people who oppose and insult them in society. I have no doubt that if the original SC people understand these facts, they will demand adequate representation for each subcaste.

I can tell you that among those who are in the forefront of the “caste annihilation campaign,” we can find many such touchable SC castes. Hindus use these touchable SC subcastes to criticise our Editor’s “caste identity” thesis.

So, to end these problems, each and every subcaste must get proportional representation in every field according to its population in the governance of the country.

On May 31, 1936, Babasaheb organised a Mahar conference in Bombay. Does it mean that he hated other subcastes? What we should build between different subcastes is fraternity (brotherhood). When we fight for our human rights, we cannot oppose the human rights of other communities. This is what our Editor means when he advocates “caste identity.”

All over the world, we can see thousands of ethnic identities. None is interested in destroying its identity. Then, why should we alone destroy our identity?

However, our ethnic identities are not jati or caste. Our people are imitating the Hindus, thinking that they are Hindus. That is why some innocent, unthinking Dalits demand the destruction of our caste.

CASTE SYMBOLISES IDENTITY

What we want to destroy is the casteism of Aryans and also non-Aryans. Destroying our identity means destroying our soul. So, we must think and talk about caste, whether it is Aryan or non-Aryan.

If the upper-caste people do not use their caste identity, how can we identify them, whether it is a cobra or a rat snake? Without identifying our Enemy first, we cannot fight the Enemy.

So, ask, think, and talk about caste for liberation. Remember, as we strengthen our identity, we should also enlighten our people on Ambedkarism and Buddhism.

Our upper-caste rulers acquired everything by their communal thinking. We also can have everything in the same way. So, we too must be communalists.

That means we must love our people.

The savarnas advise us to love the enemy. We must know the trap behind this advice. They know very well that we consider them our Enemy. That is why they ask us to love the enemy. How can we fight our enemy when we don’t hate this Enemy? If we don’t hate the Enemy, we cannot fight and secure our liberation. So, we must hate our Enemy. It is our right to hate and fight our enemy to win our liberation.

What the enemy hates, we must love, and what the enemy loves, we must hate.

Then only will we get a clear picture of the Enemy’s mind. That is why, when they ask us to destroy our caste, we say no. That is why, when they ask us to love our enemy, we oppose it.

Archival Note

Published in Dalit Voice (Vol. 22, Issue No. 20, 16 October 2003), this essay by V. T. Rajshekar intervenes in debates over the social and political composition of the anti-caste movement at a time when questions of Bahujan unity and electoral realignments were reshaping Indian politics.

Rajshekar argues that the Brahminical Social Order, rather than the Backward Classes (BCs), is the principal adversary of Dalits. He contends that excluding BCs from the Ambedkarite movement weakens the struggle against Brahminism and calls for a renewed Bahujan alliance grounded in the shared emancipatory vision of Phule, Shahu, Periyar, and Ambedkar.

More than two decades later, the essay remains relevant as anti-caste politics continues to grapple with questions of coalition-building, social solidarity, and the relationship between caste oppression and political strategy.

Dalit movement will suffer if BCs are excluded

The one-line answer to the question, “Who is the enemy of Dalits?” is the Brahmins, not BCs, who are the natural allies of Dalits.

Both the Dalits and BCs are the victims of the Brahminical Social Order. The historical truth also must be considered that the BCs and Dalits are from the same stock. Of course, we cannot ignore the involvement of forward BCs in the atrocities against Dalits. Persons enacting the rule seem to be cruel because they are in direct touch, but the actual cruelty lies in the rule and the frames of the rule. The same thing is with BCs and the BSO.

So, I suggest establishing a positive relationship between Dalits and BCs because the root cause of the problem is not the BCs but the Brahminical system.

Dalits alone can save BCs: We have to remove the false Kshatriyatva from the minds of BCs. Of course, Dalits cannot say that it is not their duty. It is their duty because they are the pillars of the Ambedkarite movement. The Dalits, as leaders of the Indian revolution, must lead the BCs also.

Our duty is to generate attachment of BCs with the ideology of Phule-Shahu-Ambedkar. The first step for this is the detachment of BCs from the Brahminical fold. Of course, BCs cannot detach themselves. It is the Dalits who have to do this job.

Restricting the movement to Dalits will not only not help our movement, but it will take the movement backward. On the contrary, we will help the BSO only. Our movement is to abolish the BSO. One of the purposes of our struggle is this. Our target should not be any individual but the culture which creates individuals like Mulayam, Kalyan, Katiyar, and even Paswan. If you want to abolish the BSO, a major part of this system should get out from the BSO, and that major part is the BCs. By avoiding the relationship between Dalits and BCs, we cannot run the Ambedkarite movement. On the contrary, we put a question mark on Phule-Shahu-Periyar-Ambedkar’s mission.

Mulayam is a Hindu: It is a misconception that BCs cannot accept Dalit leadership. Jagjivan Ram did not accept the leadership of Dr. Ambedkar. That does not mean that Dalits did not accept the leadership of Babasaheb. Today, the movement is identified with the name of Babasaheb, not Babuji. So, you cannot generalize the relationship between Dalits and BCs by citing the example of Mulayam and Kalyan (both BCs), but we must understand that they are not accepted by all the BCs. Mulayam, Kalyan, and Paswan are driven by the Brahminical force. Mulayam and Kalyan do not accept the leadership of Kanshi Ram not because of their BC origin but because of their “Hindu mentality.”

Thakur-Brahmin alliance: A leader having the Indian Constitution in one hand and the Manusmruti in another must not be tolerated, even if he is a Dalit.

When Thakurs and Brahmins can join hands to save their BSO, why not Dalits join with BCs? Look how BC MLAs in the BSP have shown their loyalty to the BSP. None of the BC MLAs other than 3 Yadavs left the party (still there are 2 Yadav MLAs with the BSP). While 1 Nishad (ST) and 1 Khatik (SC) have left the BSP, BC MLAs like Rajbhar and Maurya are still with the BSP. Who says that BCs cannot accept Dalit leadership? In UP, Swamiprasad Maurya, BSP legislature party leader, and Sukhdev Rajbhar (chief whip of the BSP) are BCs. In UP, 90% of the Rajbhars vote for the BSP. Similarly, the Maurya and Nonia (BC) castes also cast over 70% of their votes for the BSP.

We cannot put a line between Dalits and BCs because such a division will be a division of ourselves only. Koli is a caste whose subcastes are in different categories: SC, ST, BC, and outside these categories, i.e., general. Where will such castes stand? A caste like Bhar is BC in UP, SC in MP, and ST in Maharashtra.

Psychological violence: We must understand the fact that the BCs are not oppressors. Rather, they are an instrument in the hands of the oppressive forces, the BSO. We must understand that psychological violence is more injurious than physical violence. We should learn something from dogs. If somebody throws a stone at a dog, it does not run after the stone but after the hand that throws the stone. BCs are like stones that are being thrown by the BSO mind. If we do not make them (BCs) part of our struggle, they will go more and more into the BSO camp. We must develop the culture of Bahujan Samaj instead of Dalit Samaj. We should learn a lesson from the collapse of the RPI. Without the BCs, Dalits cannot capture power in the true sense. The true sense means to capture power, retain it, and use it to preserve and propagate the ideology set by our forefathers.

By the time Maharashtra’s Revenue Minister Chandrashekhar Bawankule announced that the government was withdrawing the draft Maharashtra Devasthan Inam Abolition Act, 2026, the proposed legislation had spent barely a month in the public domain. Published on May 6 for comments and objections, it was presented as an attempt to address one of the state’s longest-running land disputes: nearly 5.5 lakh hectares of Devasthan Inam land, much of it under encroachment or contested occupation, and temple trusts that had struggled to recover property endowed over centuries. Within weeks, however, the government abandoned the draft and promised to begin again.

The reversal followed sustained opposition from temple trusts and organisations including the Maharashtra Mandir Mahasangh, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti. More than a thousand trustees reportedly joined the campaign, hundreds of representations were submitted to ministers and district officials, and delegations met Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis, Deputy Chief Minister Eknath Shinde and other senior members of the government.

When the withdrawal was announced, temple organisations described it as the outcome of a collective struggle. The government, for its part, insisted that it was merely responding to concerns raised during the consultation process and that a fresh draft would be prepared after wider discussions.

According to the Revenue Department, the proposed law sought to create a statutory mechanism for recovering temple lands from illegal encroachments while protecting the rights of lawful occupants. Officials argued that temple trusts often lacked the administrative and legal capacity to reclaim endowed properties and that the state could provide a more effective framework. Bawankule repeatedly said that the proposal had been conceived on lines comparable to the legal framework governing Waqf properties, allowing the government to assist in protecting religious endowments rather than leaving trusts to pursue long and expensive litigation on their own.

Temple organisations read the draft very differently. The Maharashtra Mandir Mahasangh argued that provisions of the Bill would effectively abolish historical Devasthan Inam grants made by earlier rulers and weaken rather than strengthen temple ownership. It objected to clauses that it said recognised ownership claims of some long-term occupants, questioned restrictions on approaching civil courts, and criticised what it described as differential treatment between temple lands and Waqf properties.

Whether those objections reflected the actual legal consequences of the draft or apprehensions about how the law might eventually operate is a wholly different matter. The Hindu fold today perceives itself to be victimised in public discourse despite having been in power at the Centre for the last twelve years and mobilises moralised protest tactics that are often rooted in narratives of self-victimisation. Whatever the merits of those objections, they were enough to stop the Bill before it reached the Assembly.

The government never argued that temple lands should change hands. On the contrary, ministers repeatedly said the purpose of the Bill was to help temple trusts recover lands that had slipped into encroachment and to give those properties stronger legal protection. The resistance came from temple organisations that feared the proposed law would give the state greater control over how disputes were settled and how rights over Devasthan land would eventually be determined. Their objections were directed less at the objective than at the mechanism through which the government proposed to achieve it.

For all the talk of ideological unity, governing and movement politics do not always pull in the same direction. The Devasthan Bill became one of those moments when the seams briefly showed. Electoral alliances often make those differences easy to miss. Yet land has always been a source of authority as much as a form of property. Questions of who records land and who settles disputes have a way of exposing those tensions.

The BJP has spent much of the past decade presenting itself as the party of a strong, interventionist state. Governing through legislation inevitably extends the state’s reach into institutions that have long operated through inherited arrangements and local authority. Temple trusts may welcome stronger protection for their lands, but greater state involvement also means surrendering some control over how disputes are settled and property is administered. That is where governments and religious institutions can begin pulling in different directions. The fault lines are not entirely new. They surfaced publicly during the online battles between the so-called “raitas” and “trads” during the Bulli Bai app case, and the Devasthan Bill suggests that those disagreements extend well beyond social media into much wider political constituencies.

It is striking that the government defended the draft by invoking the legal framework surrounding Waqf properties. The comparison was meant to reassure temple trusts that similar protections could be extended to temple lands. Yet the politics around Waqf have unfolded very differently in recent years. Legislative changes affecting Muslim institutions have largely proceeded despite sustained objections from Muslim organisations. In Maharashtra, by contrast, the government withdrew its own proposal before it reached the legislature, reopened consultations and gave temple representatives a central role in rewriting the Bill.

Temple organisations opposed the draft before it entered the legislature, secured meetings with senior ministers, compelled the government to withdraw its own proposal and now have formal representation on the committee tasked with preparing a revised Bill. The committee, headed by Additional Chief Secretary Vikas Kharge, includes fifteen representatives from temple trusts alongside senior officials from the Revenue Department.

Governments routinely ask farmers’ organisations, workers’ unions, unemployed youth and communities affected by displacement to wait for departmental reviews or expert committees. Families pursuing justice after caste-based violence often confront years of administrative delay and prolonged litigation before receiving meaningful responses. Many Muslim organisations have found themselves responding to legislative changes only after they have already been enacted and have then faced criminalisation for protesting. Temple organisations, by contrast, intervened while the law was still being drafted and altered its course before it reached the legislature.

The debate has also left largely unexplored the people living on Devasthan Inam land. Public discussion has centred on temples, trusts and encroachments, while remarkably little attention has been paid to the social composition of those occupying or cultivating these lands. The category of “encroacher” can include very different histories: long-term agricultural tenancy, informal occupation, disputed ownership, commercial acquisition and settlement by landless households over several generations.

The Devasthan Bill was withdrawn after organisations within the broader Hindutva fold challenged a government that is often assumed to speak for them. The next draft of the Bill will answer some legal questions. It may also answer a political one: how much room the state still has to regulate institutions that are among its closest ideological allies.

DalitThinkerToday is an Chartered Accountant by profession from Sangli, Maharashtra who occasionally dabbles in thinking about politics when people in her oppressor caste majority office frustrate her. This is her pseudonym.

On 13 March 2026, the Freedom of Religion Bill was tabled in the Maharashtra State Assembly — the eleventh state that may have such legislation since independence. Ten similar laws in the states of Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, and Haryana have already been enacted; one in Tamil Nadu has been repealed. Two others in Arunachal Pradesh and Rajasthan were never enacted despite formulation. Home Minister Amit Shah has made an election promise that the law would be enacted in the State of Punjab as well. The stated purpose is a familiar trope: preventing conversions obtained through force, fraud, or inducement. The language is legal and respectable. The real targets are Dalits and other oppressed castes.

These laws have nothing to do with coercive religious practice. They are instruments designed to prevent the emancipation of oppressed castes from dominant castes’ hegemony — and to ensure that the dominant caste establishment’s social, economic, and civilizational hegemony, which that order has sustained for two millennia, remains intact.

Caste is not merely a social phenomenon. It is a religious system of control, encoded in the Manusmriti as a spiritual, social, and economic order and sanctified by Brahminical Hinduism for two millennia. It has structured every material dimension of life: occupation, property, education, marriage, and public space. Spiritual inequality was the foundational condition from which all socio-economic deprivation followed. The Dalit-Bahujan communities did not merely occupy the bottom of a social hierarchy — they were theologically assigned to it. Any faith that rejected that assignment was, therefore, not merely a spiritual alternative. It was a structural threat to those who benefited from the arrangement.

That is the context in which every anti-conversion law, which includes conversion to any faith, must be read.

The legislative history begins not in 1967, when Odisha enacted India’s first anti-conversion law, but in 1950, when the Presidential Order quietly excluded converts to minority faiths from the reservation protections established under Article 341 of the Constitution. The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, originally limited SC status to those professing Hinduism, and later extended it to Sikhism and Buddhism. Converts to Christianity and Islam, which form the bulk of non-Buddhist converts, lose SC status under this order, as affirmed by recent Supreme Court interpretation citing the 1950 Presidential Order in a case pertaining to Andhra Pradesh, even as a petition concerning reservation benefits for Dalit Muslims and Christians has been pending before a three-member bench of the Supreme Court since January 2011.

In 1950, this was not debated. It was not declared. It was done quietly, and widely attributed to K. M. Munshi, a Constituent Assembly member with known Manuwadi leanings, who openly opposed extending reservations to those who left the Hindu fold. The purpose was malignant.

The most consequential test of that logic came six years later. On 14 October 1956, B. R. Ambedkar — the man who had written the Constitution those same dominant caste legislators are now subverting — converted to Buddhism along with approximately half a million of his followers in Nagpur. Ambedkar had spent decades arguing that caste could not be reformed from within Hinduism because it was not an aberration within Brahminical theology but its direct product. Conversion was not apostasy. It was the exercise of the precise freedom the Constitution guaranteed. The 1950 Presidential Order had already moved to penalise that choice economically. Had these state anti-conversion laws existed in 1956, Ambedkar’s event at Nagpur — the largest mass act of religious self-determination in modern Indian history — would have required prior government approval under the very constitutional order he had designed. The extension of SC status to Navayana Buddhism only happened in 1990 under the V. P. Singh government. That is not an irony, it is the point. These laws are aimed, in their structure and intent, at preventing socio-economic outcomes exactly like what Ambedkar fought for in that spiritual and social context.

Christianity’s presence in India is not a colonial imposition. St. Thomas arrived on the Malabar Coast in the first century AD. Catholicism spread along India’s western coast after the Portuguese conquest of Goa in 1510, and later inland, focusing on the emancipation of oppressed castes, even as they had their own interests in doing so. During colonial rule, Protestant missionaries added to the work Catholics were doing — running schools and hospitals where none existed and agitating against oppressive caste practices, among them the requirement in parts of South India that Dalit women leave their breasts uncovered as a mark of caste subordination. The tangible improvements these missions delivered to Dalits are documented. The Savarna response to those improvements has also been documented, including in the form of every anti-conversion law that followed.

The rhetorical device used to delegitimise this history is the accusation of “ricebag Christians” — the claim that conversions were purchased with food rather than chosen in conscience. When people are starving, providing food alongside a theology that affirms their equality before God is not inducement. It is the practical application of that theology that responds to social reality.

In 1956, the Madhya Pradesh government appointed a committee under Hindu nationalist former judge M. B. Niyogi to examine missionary activities in the state. The Committee was formed in response to the Bharatiya Jana Sangh’s “Anti-Foreign Missionary Week” protest. Set up by a Congress government, it recommended legally prohibiting conversions that were not fully voluntary, but the proposal was not implemented at the time, as it would have been difficult to enforce without violating constitutional religious freedoms. The Niyogi Report was not an inquiry. It was a brief for the prosecution, prepared in advance of charges not yet formally filed. It catalogued missionary schools, hospitals, orphanages, and social service institutions — and then attributed to all of it a calculated programme of conversion through inducement. It did not disprove the emancipatory value of these institutions to oppressed castes. It simply recast that value as evidence of conspiracy. The Niyogi Report provided the ideological and legislative scaffolding for the Odisha anti-conversion law of 1967, and its logic has been reproduced in every state law enacted since.

The constitutional foundation for these laws was established by the Supreme Court’s 1977 ruling in Rev. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which held that the right to “propagate” religion under Article 25 does not include a right to convert another person. This distinction, applied carefully, is reasonable. Applied as it has been in practice, it is not. The right to convert another person was never what the church claimed.

By constructing its judgment around the prevention of an act that was not in dispute, the Court gave legislative cover to restrict the proclamation of faith itself — and since the state now determined what constitutes illegitimate persuasion, any message compelling enough to move oppressed caste persons toward a different understanding of their own worth can be prosecuted as inducement. The Allahabad High Court has recently reaffirmed the right to propagate and proclaim one’s faith, which amounts to an implicit rebuke of how the Stanislaus judgment has been operationalised.

With the BJP’s rise to national power in 1999 and its consolidation under Narendra Modi in 2014 — whose political formation within the Sangh Parivar is defined by the goal of a Hindu Rashtra, which implicitly requires the maintenance of the caste hierarchy that Brahminical Hinduism produced — seven additional states enacted anti-conversion laws. Each successive iteration grew more elaborate in its administrative requirements.

The most recent versions require prior government approval, inserting a state official between a citizen and a decision of personal conscience in direct tension with Article 21 of the Constitution. An oppressed caste person who wishes to leave the faith that theologically sanctions their subordination must now obtain permission from an apparatus largely controlled by the communities that have historically benefited from that subordination.

The Tamil Nadu precedent is sometimes cited to argue that anti-conversion legislation crosses party lines. In 2002, the AIADMK government enacted a similar law. This requires little explanation: the AIADMK was then a coalition partner in the BJP-led NDA government and enacted the law to sustain that alliance. Tamil Nadu has one of India’s oldest and most rooted Christian populations. The law was repealed in 2004 when the UPA came to power, under pressure from Christian communities — confirming that it had no independent political logic in the state and was adopted purely as a coalition obligation. Nonetheless, this signals the state’s willingness to compromise constitutional freedoms for political expediency.

When the complete sequence is examined together — the 1950 Presidential Order, the Niyogi Report, the Stanislaus judgment, and the cascade of state laws — the pattern is coherent and consistent. The RSS, Jana Sangh, Janata Party, and BJP share an unbroken ideological lineage rooted in a Brahminical Hindu nationalist vision, combining a project of social dominance over internal subaltern communities with a resistance to religious influences perceived as external threats.

Over seventy percent of India’s population — the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes combined — belong to communities that Christian social and educational institutions most consistently serve. It is precisely the emancipation of these communities — economic, educational, and spiritual — that strikes at the material interests of the Savarna establishment that has historically thrived on their exploitation. The Mandal Commission’s implementation dismantled the Savarna monopoly over state employment and political power. The Church in India, through civil society institutions, has been eroding their civilisational dominance for far longer. Anti-conversion laws are the establishment’s response to both.

The Church is not above scrutiny in this account. Caste has penetrated Christian institutions in India in ways that contradict the theology that made those institutions work for oppressed caste communities in the first place — separate cemeteries, separate seating, upper-caste dominance of church hierarchies still continue in diminishing measures, with Dalit theology now in vogue in seminaries, gradually dissipating these anomalies. That contradiction is real and must be named.

Yet this does not change the fact that the laws are designed not to reform Christian institutions from within, but to prevent oppressed caste communities from accessing them at all. The internal failures of the Church are a problem the Church must answer for. The anti-conversion laws are a problem the state must answer for. Conflating the two serves only those who drafted the legislation.

There is a reason no central anti-conversion law has been passed at the national level: it would face a full constitutional bench and would not survive the judicial test. The state laws function as instruments of attrition — they harass clerics and communities, deter others from exercising their rights, create a climate of legal uncertainty, and signal to oppressed castes that the price of emancipation will be as high as the state can make it. Their authors are not constitutionally naive. They know better than to invite a definitive national ruling.

The multiplication of these laws since 1999 is evidence that they are not impeding Christian emancipation efforts. If oppressed castes had stopped choosing emancipation, new laws would be unnecessary. If earlier laws had effectively blocked the exit, elaboration would be redundant. The inclusion of administrative approval requirements in the most recent iterations — including the Maharashtra Bill now passed in both the Houses and awaiting Governor Jishnu Dev Varma’s assent — confirms that those prosecuting this project are aware it is failing socially and are escalating in response. Escalation in the face of failure is not a sign of strength. It is a sign that the outcome they feared is continuing regardless.

A nation that directs its legislative energy toward preventing the emancipation of the majority of its population — the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes who together constitute over seventy percent of India’s people — in order to protect the privileges of numerically smaller Savarnas at the top cannot expect that arrangement to produce equitable development. The evidence is already visible in the widening gap between India’s claims to being the world’s fifth-largest economy and the material conditions of the oppressed castes whose labour has always underwritten that economy.

The courts will, hopefully, eventually confirm what the constitutional record already shows: these laws were not enacted with confidence in their constitutionality. They were enacted with confidence in political impunity to impede the emancipation of oppressed caste communities. That foundation is far more fragile than it appears.

The emancipation of oppressed castes is not a process that can be permanently arrested by administrative procedure. Ambedkar understood this. The six hundred thousand people who walked with him in Nagpur in 1956 understood it. The millions who have followed in the decades since understand it. History does not offer a single example of a project designed to lock human beings into inherited degradation that finally succeeded. The architects of this one will find no exception to that record.

Oliver D’Souza is a former journalist and an author.

The editorial ‘Anti-Brahminism as an Ideology’ from the original Dalit Voice run’s Vol. 2, Issue No. 10 (01/03/1983) critically explores anti-Brahminism as a powerful indigenous philosophy and social movement that has profoundly shaped Indian history, society, and politics by opposing the entrenched caste hierarchy symbolized by Brahmin dominance. While acknowledging that anti-Brahminism does not constitute a systematic ideology in the classical sense, the piece argues that it functions as a necessary and enduring counterpoint to Brahminism’s religiously sanctioned exploitation, embedded in a caste system that subjugates millions, including women and even Brahmins themselves. Tracing the genealogy of this resistance through seminal figures—from Buddha and Phule to Ambedkar, Periyar, and Lohia—the essay positions anti-Brahminism as a secular, revolutionary force committed to the destruction of caste’s core institutions: sacred scriptures, priesthood, and caste itself.

At the same time, V. T. Rajshekar’s framing of caste as a specifically Indian and Brahminical phenomenon invites critical unsettling. Treating caste as an exclusively Hindu aberration risks obscuring the broader social logic through which descent-based and occupation-linked hierarchies reproduce themselves globally. Comparable regimes of inherited exclusion—such as those experienced by Haratine and Osu communities in parts of Africa, the Burakumin in Japan, and Quilombola and Palenque communities in Latin America—demonstrate that caste-like structures are not civilizational anomalies but recurring social forms produced at the intersection of labour, purity, and power. Contemporary Dalit movements have increasingly foregrounded these parallels, forging transnational solidarities that situate anti-caste struggle within a wider global politics against racialization, coerced labour, and inherited inequality.

The essay also situates anti-Brahminism at the centre of a broad spectrum of social movements, including Dravidian identity politics and Dalit emancipation, which mobilize histories and cultures of India’s “original inhabitants” to counter Aryan and Brahminical narratives. While such claims of indigeneity are politically potent and historically intelligible within anti-caste struggles, they must be read as strategic polemics rather than settled historical truths. Across genetics, archaeology, linguistics, and critical historiography, the evidence points to long population continuity and repeated admixture in South Asia, with categories such as Shudra, “untouchable,” and tribe emerging much later as historically contingent social hierarchies rather than as markers of a singular, primordial indigenous people. Recognizing this does not diminish anti-Brahminism’s political force; rather, it sharpens its critique by anchoring caste firmly in relations of domination and social reproduction rather than in competing origin myths.

Yet, engaging this legacy from the vantage point of the twenty-first century—long after Rajshekar’s original intervention—also demands a critical reckoning with the limits of anti-Brahminism as a purely negative philosophy. Contemporary anti-caste politics is increasingly fragmented, particularly in the electoral sphere, where alliances and compromises risk diluting its radical horizon, a trajectory that would have deeply troubled Ambedkar. The present conjuncture calls for renewed efforts to articulate a positive and shared minimum programme of anti-Brahminism or anti-caste politics—one that foregrounds liberty, equality, and dignity, and translates these principles into concrete social-justice demands, as many anti-caste thinkers and practitioners are already attempting to do. Importantly, while the essay does not necessarily state this explicitly, it underscores the dual role of anti-Brahminism in fostering self-respect and political consciousness among marginalized communities,  In presenting anti-Brahminism not merely as opposition but as a constructive and historic force for justice, the essay challenges readers at this summit to engage deeply with the legacies of caste resistance and the ongoing struggle for equality, dignity, and democracy in India.

The essay is a key text from the archives of Dalit Voice for exposing the tensions within broader national and leftist movements. For contemporary NGOs, academics, activists, and journalists, this piece serves as a vital reminder that caste oppression remains foundational to India’s social inequalities and that any emancipatory work must confront this reality head-on. It also raises critical questions about the complexities of identity politics, the role of religion and tradition in oppression, and the necessity of inclusive yet uncompromising strategies for social transformation.

V. T. Rajshekar

“Anti-Brahminism” may not be a perfect, systematic ideology, but it undoubtedly is a powerful philosophy which once moved, and still moves, millions of people—not only among Hindus in India, but others as well. Since some urban-bred people cannot so much appreciate the importance and significance of this most powerful indigenous ideology, an effort is being made here to go into its different aspects.”

How can anti-Brahminism, a negative concept, be an ideology or a philosophy? It is being described so for want of any other appropriate name. When Brahminism can be a philosophy, why not anti-Brahminism? Suffice it to say that the revolt against the domination of Brahmins and even those non-Brahmins immediately below them in the Hindu caste hierarchy by those who have suffered at the hands of Brahminism has played and continues to play a great role in shaping Indian society and politics. Anti-Brahminism has, therefore, been the central theme of all protest movements in India for centuries—from the days the Aryans invaded India.

However, anti-Brahminism cannot be confined merely to a revolt against the Brahmins alone but includes all those non-Brahmins who subscribe to their value system. Brahminism is, therefore, more dangerous than Brahmins, because the Brahmins themselves have been victims of Brahminism. From the Buddha, the greatest enemy of Brahminism, Basaveshwara, Guru Nanak, Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Dayananda Saraswati, to Mahatma Phule, Narayana Guru, Ambedkar, Lohia, and Periyar E. V. Ramaswamy—all of them rank among India’s most virulent crusaders against Brahminism. Therefore, anti-Brahminism can be considered the most indigenous among the different secular ideologies of India. Social or political leaders can ignore this ideology only at their peril.

What gives teeth to anti-Brahminism is the caste system, which is a specific Indian phenomenon. Caste is the curse of Hinduism, with its ascending scale of reverence and descending degree of contempt. Anti-Brahminism believes that the caste structure, with the Brahmin standing at the apex of this deathless pyramid, is the root cause of exploitation, inhumanity, and slavery in India. The Brahmin domination has religious sanction, and the Brahmin hereditary priesthood plays a central role in perpetuating Brahminism. Therefore, anti-Brahminism calls for the destruction of its three major institutions—the “Sacred Scriptures,” the caste system, and priestcraft. This is the quintessence of its philosophy.

Including the Brahmin, every Hindu has been a victim of Brahminism, particularly the Untouchables, many of whom have sought refuge in other religions to escape its tyranny. Women, including women among Brahmins, have suffered silently from the barbarity of Brahminism. Even Vivekananda and Gandhi, two of its greatest pillars, were forced to speak out against the havoc caused by Brahminism. M. N. Roy and Nehru—both Brahmins—had also lent powerful support to anti-Brahminism. “Democracy and caste cannot coexist,” they said. Anti-Brahminism has thus become the most powerful ideology that has moved every social, cultural, literary, and political movement in India since the days of Jainism, over 2,500 years ago. Every political party was rocked by it. Even the Communist parties were not spared, and many splits took place because Indian Marxists refused to heed the pulls of this ideology.

Mahatma Phule of Maharashtra is considered the father of this anti-Brahminism in recent times. Author of several books on this philosophy and founder of the powerful Satya Shodak Movement, he described the Manusmriti as an unholy book. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, an “Untouchable”, was mainly inspired by Phule, who belonged to a backward (gardener) caste. Anti-Brahminism also became the ideology of a powerful social, cultural, and political movement for realising the Dravidian identity of Tamils. Founded in 1944 by Periyar E. V. Ramaswamy, the DMK of Annadurai came as an offshoot of DK in 1949. EVR improved upon this philosophy and ridiculed the Hindu gods and the Hindu religion itself. Hinduism (its correct name is Brahminism), he said, was founded by Brahmins to exploit the poor, illiterate, and ignorant masses. The abolition of Brahmin priestly services was his basic programme.

Ambedkar followed a similar line of thinking. He said caste deadens, paralyses, and cripples the people. It has ruined the Hindus and has destroyed, demoralised, and devitalised Hindu society. Ranked among the greatest thinkers and philosophers of modern India, Ambedkar, in his innumerable books, has given a call to free every woman and man from the thralldom of “sacred scriptures.” He also considered the priest as the real villain of Brahminism. Both Ambedkar and EVR dubbed Brahminism as a reactionary philosophy.

What did anti-Brahminism achieve? By reviving the glorious cultural and social traditions of the original inhabitants of India before the Aryan invasion, it helped them to find their roots, gain self-identity, and recover self-respect. Phule, Ambedkar, and EVR said shudras and atishudras (Untouchables), along with tribals, were the original inhabitants of India before the Aryan invasion, and they had enough historical evidence. To condemn the Brahmin as a stranger in Tamil Nadu has become a handy weapon of the non-Brahmin to beat the Brahmin with, but popularising the myth of their Dravidian origin also gave Tamil non-Brahmin Hindus both an identity and a self-confidence, says E. F. Irschick.

Evidence has also been found to prove that Tamil society was free from idol worship and the caste system before Brahminism invaded. The Indus Valley Civilization has conclusively proved that the Aryans were not the first or the most important creators of Indian culture. Father Heras said that Tamils were the purest cultural descendants of the Indus Valley.

Brahminism, being a proselytising religion, savagely persecuted Jains and Buddhists and reconverted them to Hinduism—a new name given to Brahminism after the death of the Buddha. Murder and torture of Buddhists and Jains are cited by many historians. Behind the DK-DMK slogan of “Tamil for Tamilians” lies the conviction that Aryans are the aliens and non-Brahmins are the Dravidians. Anti-Brahminism has thus brought a new awakening, a new pride among the non-Brahmins, and convinced them that their poverty and suffering were due to Brahminism.

The emphasis given to social revolution has made them conscious of their exploitation at the hands of Brahmins. So much so that many non-Brahmins preferred British rule to Brahmin rule. Both Ambedkar and Periyar EVR boldly said so. It is this anti-Brahminism that drove EVR out of the Congress and made him found the Self-Respect Movement. Later, he launched an agitation for a separate Dravidastan. EVR also said that the so-called nationalism is nothing but Brahminism in another form. The growth of RSS and Jan Sangh (now BJP) has confirmed their fear.

Lohia contributed a great deal to the promotion of anti-Brahminism in the Hindi heartland. Lohiaites all over India are today in the vanguard of anti-Brahminism. It is to be noted that all the leaders of anti-Brahminism came into conflict with the Indian Left movement for ignoring the basic principles of its philosophy. All of them warned that Marxism, an alien philosophy, cannot take root in India as long as it fails to attack Brahminism and its three pillars. Ambedkar said Brahminism and capitalism are the twin enemies of the working class and that both must be attacked simultaneously. He criticised Dange, the lone Lenin Order winner in India, and others controlling the Communist parties as a “bunch of Brahmin boys.” EVR was also critical of the Brahmin domination of the Communist parties—so too was Lohia. Caste being the principal contradiction in India, its elimination should be our prime effort.

One of the greatest impacts of anti-Brahminism was on education. Phule and Ambedkar launched an education drive among the low castes, laying stress on anti-Brahminism in their books. Ambedkar set up a chain of educational institutions. Both Phule and Periyar introduced anti-Brahmin interpretations of the Puranas. The Ramayana and Mahabharata, the epics, are interpreted as a fight between Brahmins and non-Brahmins. Bonfires of the Gita and Manusmriti, which spread the poison of Brahminism, became popular. Ambedkar himself publicly burnt the Manusmriti in 1927. Periyar entered temples and broke idols, burnt scriptures, tarred hotel name boards bearing Brahmin names, and cut Brahmin tufts. His most popular programme, which turned out to be a mass movement, was “self-respect.”

[Testimony to delegates to the Seventh Assembly of the Christian Conference of Asia held in Bangalore, from May 18, 1981 given by D.M. Thimmarayappa, Convener, Karnataka Dalit Action Committee, Bangalore, on behalf of the untouchables of India.]. 

Sisters and brothers,  

We represent the above organisation comprising mainly the untouchables. Ours is a militant group wedded to the philosophy of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, not only the greatest leader of untouchables but the greatest Indian born in India after the Buddha, whose name is a household word in the whole of Asia.  

Ambedkar said untouchables are reduced to slaves in India because of Hindu religion and therefore, he quit Hinduism and became a Buddhist.  

Hundreds of untouchables all over India have got converted to Christianity. Buddhism and Islam, Sikhism, etc. because of this oppressive Hindu religion.  

CLOSELY GUARDED SECRET  

The problem of the untouchables, forming almost a third of India’s 800 million population, is not so simple as to state it in a note like this.  

There is no problem in the whole world more serious than the problem of the Indian Apartheid. However, it remains a closely guarded secret. Every day untouchables are kicked, killed, burnt, raped and their property destroyed all over India which prides itself as the largest democracy in the world-the land of Gandhi, non-violence and what not. But nobody talks about it in India. The ruling class keeps this as a closely guarded secret. The Hindu hypocrites make much of the racial discrimination in US., U.K., Africa, etc. ‘But the most naked form of race hatred is here in India. 

Caste war is spreading all over India and we are thinking of approaching the UNO and the Human Rights Commission to fight for our demands of separate homeland or Dalitasthan  

The entire wealth of the country is produced by this servant class. They carry the burden of the whole land as sweepers, scavengers, tanners, agricultural labourers.

Untouchability is born out of prejudice. Therefore, it is more dangerous than any other problem because it is invisible You cannot racially make out a person belonging to the untouchable class. Therefore, it is a problem born out of prejudice. And this mental prejudice has reduced a third of the Indian population to be economically the poorest, socially the lowest, physically the weakest, culturally the most deprived, mutually divided, totally illiterate, landless, dumb-driven cattle. A living dead-the largest persecuted minority in the world.  

THE POISON OF HINDUISM  

The poison of the Hindu religion has infected the untouchables as well. They are also divided into several sub-castes. There are untouchables among untouchables.  

Although the untouchables are the original inhabitants of India, before the Aryans invaded India and established Brahminism (Hinduism), they too got polluted by this religion and further degenerated themselves. Once kept out of the Hindu religion the Hindu revivalist (fascist) organisations are doing their best to ‘Hinduise’ the untouchables, so that they will not quit the Hindu fold and swell the ranks of Christianity and Islam.

It is these very same Hindu revivalist organisations who are now and then raising the bogey of conversion. The Christians are charged with “forcible” conversion The Hindu religion despises the untouchable and tortures him as long as he is inside the Hindu religion. But the moment he thinks of quitting because of this torture and seeks social respectability by getting converted, the “ruling class” of India punishes him by withdrawing “reservations” given to him in the Constitution.  

ROLE OF BRAHMINS  

Both ways the untouchable is punished. He can neither live nor die. It is a living death. Have you ever heard of a parallel to this in any part of the world?  

In other societies and cultures, the status of a person is decided on the basis of his qualification, scholarship, power he is enjoying, the bank balance he is holding. None will have all this right at birth. They are all acquired. But in Hindu India status comes right at the birth. It is the birth that decides the status The Hindu society divided into several castes-ascending order of reverence and descending order of contempt-has no respect for scholarship or intellect.  

Here in India, the status is decided not on the basis of one’s office. Even a Deputy Prime Minister of India (Jagjivan Ram) was once insulted by the high caste Brahmin boys because he was an untouchable. Status in Hindu India is decided on the basis of birth and caste. Have you ever heard about this anywhere? Even dogs and cats are allowed inside the houses but not untouchables. Humans have no value in Hindu India.  

We have animal-lovers club, tree-lovers club, bird-lovers club. But no human-lovers club. It is a vast desert where the milk of human kindness has dried up.  

The untouchables of India have hardly any friends inside the country. The Press is hostile, police are its main enemy, the Government is not bothered. Every opportunity is barred. Therefore, we have no other go but to seek friends outside.  

And if there is one section in India which is responsible for creating this world’s greatest mayhemed minority it is the Brahmins-India’s ruling class. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, had come to this conclusion after years of research and practical experience.

There is no deprivation greater than cultural deprivation Brahmins have blown the brain out of the untouchables. The Brahmin religion of Hinduism has mesmerised the untouchables and emasculated them into the most culturally deprived race in the world Can there be a greater crime than this?  

CHURCH CRITICISED  

It is said that poverty breeds communism If so the entire lot of these wretched of the earth should have been in Communist parties They should have been the first to join the Communist parties. But alas, even the Indian Marxist leadership has double-crossed them.  

Because, the leadership of the parties is also in the hands of Brahmins and other high castes. That is the reason for India not having a revolution,  

From centuries, the high castes of India have used them as slaves and serfs. The creed of non-violence is solely intended to keep them disarmed, emasculated. The Hindu religion has drugged them with the opium of “Karma”-the destiny-fate. That is why they can’t even think of protest, let alone rebel. They do and die without ever questioning how and why.  

Therefore, the Christians owe a duty to save this wretched of the earth. We admit that nobody has done greater service to the untouchables of India as the Christians. That is why thousands of them have embraced this religion.  

But unfortunately, even after conversion, they continue to be untouchables. This is yet another tragedy. Christianity therefore, failed to fully liberate them-still in many parts of India, converted untouchables have separate churches, segregated graveyards Segregation continues even after conversion. It is here that the Christians should do some heart-searching and plain-speaking.  

The CCA must address itself to this grave problem. It must also give the highest priority to the liberation of untouchables by treating it as the world’s greatest problem needing the immediate attention of the Church.  

Liberation of untouchables should be the No. 1 item in the Christian agenda. And we assure our fullest co-operation in this most humanitarian task.  

[The speech was greeted with prolonged cheers and the chairman said they were deeply touched by the Apartheid in India and the church would do everything to liberate the untouchables.]