This piece, adapted from Chapter 2, “Annihilation of Caste,” in Caste – A Nation Within the Nation, has been abridged, edited, and selectively rephrased to highlight the conjoined conceptual rigor and moral conviction that animate V. T. Rajshekar’s writing. The purpose of this version is to reveal the enduring force of his argument and its continued relevance to the present moment of caste politics and thought. In this essay, Rajshekar dissects caste as the central ideological and structural principle of Indian society—an all-encompassing system that determines not only social hierarchy but also access to political power, knowledge, and morality. He argues that caste cannot be dismantled through moral persuasion or partial reform because it is the very grammar of Hindu social order. Drawing from Ambedkar yet extending beyond him, Rajshekar exposes how religion, law, and politics work in concert to preserve Brahminical dominance. For him, annihilation means confrontation: a total break with the social, spiritual, and epistemic order that legitimizes caste. The essay stands as both critique and declaration, demanding not reconciliation but the assertion of Dalit consciousness as the ground for any true democratic transformation.
However, Rajshekar’s forceful framing also opens up crucial points of tension worth registering. His deployment of the language of “nation” and “national minorities” for Bahujans—though strategically potent—risks reproducing the very nationalist grammar that has historically absorbed, redirected, or neutralized anti-caste energies. The presumption that “nationhood” is a stable or emancipatory horizon for Bahujans overlooks how nationalism in the subcontinent has routinely demanded caste-erasure at the symbolic level while sustaining caste power in practice. A critique aligned with Ambedkar’s own caution would remind us that the nation is not automatically a vehicle of justice; rather, it has often operated as the ideological shield for Brahminical majoritarianism. Any appeal to national belonging must therefore be critically examined so that it does not reinscribe the homogenizing impulses it seeks to break.
Similarly, the text suggests a sharp opposition between caste-bound villages and propaganda-driven cities, as though the former naturally preserve anti-Hindutva potential and the latter incubate Brahminical hegemony. This distinction, already unstable in Rajshekar’s time, is even less tenable today. Rural India has never been uniformly resistant to Hindutva, nor have urban centres been coherent sites of caste blindness. The circulation of media, the penetration of welfare networks, the transformation of local political economies, and the recomposition of rural–urban migration have all produced a far more entangled terrain. Village social order does not automatically protect Bahujan interests; it can reproduce the violence of caste more directly, even as it occasionally generates solidarities unavailable in urban anonymity. Any contemporary evaluation must abandon this binary and analyze how caste power now moves fluidly across both spaces.
Finally, Rajshekar’s argument that Hindutva remains a primarily Brahminical project does not fully anticipate the demographic restructuring of the Hindu Right. Today, its organizational strength and electoral reach depend heavily on OBC and non-Brahmin participation—not only as foot soldiers but as ideological and political actors within the movement. This does not invalidate Rajshekar’s critique of Brahminical dominance; rather, it complicates the picture by showing how caste power adapts, absorbs, and redeploys the aspirations of groups historically positioned outside the Brahminical core. Any contemporary reading must therefore account for how Hindutva now functions through a broadened social base, and why anti-caste politics must confront this expanded constituency rather than an imagined Brahmin minority alone.Taken together, these tensions do not diminish the power of Rajshekar’s intervention; they sharpen it by situating his insights within a transformed political landscape. The stakes of annihilation today demand both the fidelity to Ambedkarite confrontation and a critical rethinking of the categories—nation, village, caste bloc, majority/minority—through which the struggle has been historically articulated.
V. T. Rajshekar
Hindu Angle of ‘Caste Annihilation’
It is the Hindus who stand to gain most from the caste system, for caste is another name for Hinduism. If caste is destroyed, Hinduism collapses. Gandhi knew this and opposed any fight against caste, for his defense of “Varna Dharma” safeguarded Hindu order. No Hindu is prepared to give up caste; caste is the source of their power.
Why then have Hindus suddenly begun talking of “caste annihilation”? Are they ready to sacrifice their privileges? Some honest vaidiks, like the Puri Shankaracharya, openly declare that Bahujans are not Hindus and hence outcastes; we have no quarrel with such honesty. Our problem is with the deceitful “socialist” Brahmins who cloak themselves as Gandhians, Marxists, or nationalists while preserving caste.
Their “caste annihilation” means the abolition of caste-based reservations, not the destruction of caste itself. They want to preserve their superiority while preaching equality — taking Dalits into temples but never allowing them priesthood, welcoming them into Brahmin-owned hotels but never letting them own one. Their idea is to change form without changing content, to keep the power hierarchy intact. They advise the scavenger to take pride in cleaning toilets instead of demanding liberation. This Gandhian hypocrisy, perfected by institutions like Sulabh International, is what they call “caste annihilation.”
Bahujan Angle of ‘Caste Annihilation’
For Bahujans, annihilating caste means destroying the power structure itself. Ambedkarites understand caste as an ascending scale of reverence and a descending scale of contempt. Gandhi’s temple-entry and inter-dining gimmicks never touched this structure. As Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar showed, the root of untouchability is the caste system; the root of caste is religion; and the root of that religion is Brahminical authority sustained by power.
Ambedkar sought to transform the very body of caste, not its surface symptoms. He knew that deprivation and humiliation were political, not moral, conditions. Unless the powerless are empowered, the powerful will never treat them as equals. The Ambedkarite view holds that social equality follows political and economic power. Reservation, therefore, is not charity but an assertion of human rights — a corrective to centuries of exclusion. When rights are restored, the oppressed gain power; when power shifts, equality begins.
Hindus wish only to soften the feelings emanating from caste while leaving the structure untouched. Bahujans aim to destroy its foundation. Hindus cure the symptoms of the disease; Bahujans aim to cure the disease itself.
Hindu Opposition to the Bahujan Angle
Hindus object that caste-based empowerment will strengthen caste, harm national integration, and endanger Hindu unity. Their real fear is that an empowered Bahujan consciousness will destroy the Hindu social order. When they call for caste annihilation, they mean the abolition of resentment among the oppressed — not the privileges of the oppressor. They fear that Dalit assertion will polarize society and lead to a “caste war,” which indeed would end the caste system and minority Hindu rule.
The Brahmins, masters of contradiction, understand Ambedkarism better than most Bahujans. They exploit caste divisions to protect Hindu supremacy. Many Bahujans, seduced by Brahminical media and “secular” rhetoric, fail to see that what the Hindus hate, they should love — and what Hindus love, they should question.
Ambedkarite interpretation of caste annihilation strengthens castes
The Hindu claim that caste-based reservations strengthen caste is only half true. It is true that caste must first consolidate before it can be dismantled. Caste-based representation requires the collective strength of each deprived group; it is a necessary stage in annihilating hierarchy. The Constitution itself recognizes caste as the basis for remedy, granting reservations to Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes. This recognition has empowered Dalits politically and psychologically, enabling them to become a force in national life.
Those who oppose caste identity while benefiting from reservation are deluded. Without caste identification, there would be no eligibility for justice. The so-called “creamy layer” debate further exposes the Hindu anxiety: upper castes resent any rise in Dalit or OBC power. Reservation has created a new confidence — a ladder the privileged now want to kick away.
Ambedkar sought to employ caste-based reservation to consolidate the oppressed as a political community capable of challenging Brahminical domination. Every assertion of caste identity among the marginalized weakens the monopoly of the Hindu minority. Gujarat’s caste wars of the 1980s proved this; Dalit anger, when misdirected against Muslims, only helped consolidate Hindu rule. The lesson remains clear — caste consciousness, not religious nationalism, is the path to equality.
Struggle and Identity
Every struggle for power begins with the assertion of a distinct identity. The oppressor always denies the separate existence of the oppressed to sustain domination. As Dr. Y. N. Kly observed in International Law and the Dalits in India, the Dalits form a distinct people, historically denounced as “outcastes” outside Hinduism. Their forced inclusion as “Scheduled Castes within Hinduism” after independence was a political act — to consolidate India under Hindu dominance. Recognition of Dalits as a separate national minority was deliberately erased from the Constitution.
The 1950 Presidential Order, by denying minority status to Dalits, imposed a Hindu identity on them. Such an identity is an aggression on self-respect. True emancipation requires its rejection. As Ambedkar argued through the Mahad and Nasik agitations, liberation demands independent representation and political power — not inclusion under Hindu paternalism.
Other oppressed peoples, from Eelam Tamils to Chechens, have shown that asserting distinct identity is the first step toward self-determination. Similarly, when SCs, STs, and OBCs demand caste-wise representation, they signal that they are not Hindus but distinct nations within India’s social geography. Their demand for power-sharing amounts to a declaration of self-rule — not secession, but autonomy in shaping their destiny.
This is why the Hindu minority fears caste consolidation. Bahujan identity is their greatest threat. Every move — from Gandhism to Marxism to Hindutva — has sought to dissolve that identity in a false national unity. But each has failed in the face of resurgent caste consciousness.
Failure of ‘Hindu Unity’
The Aryan bid for “Hindu unity” has repeatedly collapsed against India’s resilient village social order, which, though oppressive, remains immune to urban Brahminical propaganda. The BJP’s Hindutva thrives in cities where media and money rule, but it cannot easily penetrate caste-based village structures. Villages preserve both the oppression and the consciousness of caste — a double-edged reality.
When Hindu leaders attempt to dissolve caste distinctions under the banner of unity, they face resistance from the very structure they exploit. Their project depends on manufacturing an external enemy — historically the Muslim — to divert the anger of Dalits and Bahujans. In Gujarat, Dalit participation in anti-Muslim violence marked the tragic success of this manipulation, where caste pride was replaced by Hindu pride.
Yet the same Gujarat also showed that when Dalits fought upper castes, it exposed the core contradiction of Hinduism. Caste identity remains the best defense against Hindutva, the surest means to frustrate Brahminical rule through a silent, bloodless revolution. The villages of India, however unequal, remain fortresses of this social truth — that Hindutva cannot erase caste, and caste, once politicized, can dismantle Hindutva.
Our confusion lies not in the villages but in the cities. Urban Dalits and OBCs, intoxicated by Brahminical media, fail to distinguish between Ambedkar’s programme of caste annihilation and the Hindu deceit of the same name. True annihilation begins with self-respect and ends with equality of power — not with assimilation under Hinduism.
Conclusion
Caste annihilation cannot mean the erasure of caste identity while caste power endures. It must mean the destruction of the hierarchy that sustains it. The Bahujan path, grounded in Ambedkar’s vision, demands empowerment before erasure, equality before unity, and power before reconciliation.
The struggle for identity, dignity, and representation is not contrary to annihilation; it is its necessary condition. Only when the oppressed define themselves can they redefine the nation. Until then, every slogan of “Hindu unity” or “caste annihilation” from above is another mask of domination.
The road to freedom lies in consolidating Bahujan identity, transforming caste into a weapon of liberation, and reclaiming power from those who have ruled in its name. Caste, once the chain, becomes the site of struggle — and in that struggle lies the true beginning of its annihilation.




