The Politics of the Historically Oppressed Communities and Emerging Transformations in Kerala

Introduction

The recent election campaigns and electoral outcomes in Kerala reveal an important shift in the political economy of the state. Historically oppressed communities, particularly Dalits, Adivasis, Queer people, coastal communities and plantation labour populations, are increasingly reshaping democratic discourse through political responses to unequal development, land alienation, labour precarity, ecological vulnerability and exclusion from institutional power. Kerala’s development model has long been celebrated for its welfare system, literacy and public health achievements. Yet beneath this progressive image, structural inequalities around caste, land ownership, labour relations and representation persisted. The recent elections indicate that the historically oppressed communities are no longer willing to remain silent participants within larger ideological coalitions and are instead asserting independent political agency. A key feature of this shift is the emergence of intersectional solidarity linking caste, labour, ecology, gender, climate vulnerability and democratic representation. The growing assertion of Dalit and Adivasi leadership is therefore not merely symbolic identity politics, but also rooted in struggles over land, labour, rehabilitation, environmental governance and access to state power.

 

Decline of the Left in Kerala and the Crisis of the “Casteless” Narrative

One of the most significant political developments in Kerala is the visible decline of the CPM and the broader Left among sections of historically oppressed communities. The Left historically built legitimacy through class politics, labour struggles, land reforms and welfare governance. However, many Dalit and Adivasi intellectuals increasingly argue that Left politics failed to adequately confront the persistence of caste within Kerala society. The long-standing “casteless Kerala” narrative often invisibilized continuing inequalities in land ownership, institutional representation, educational access and social dignity. The political posturing around “castelessness,” including within universal welfare and “zero poverty” narratives, was increasingly criticized for masking structural caste inequalities rather than confronting them. This critique intensified further with the Left government’s endorsement of Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) reservation in Kerala. Many Dalit and Adivasi activists viewed this as an ideological shift that diluted the structural basis of caste-based reservation by reframing affirmative action through economic criteria.

Within Dalit intellectual circles, this was interpreted as evidence that the Left was increasingly accommodating upper-caste anxieties and middle-class aspirations rather than deepening anti-caste politics. The implications were both political and ideological. Historically oppressed communities increasingly expect political frameworks that directly address caste, land inequality, ecological injustice and democratic representation instead of subsuming them entirely within class-based narratives. The decline of older ideological certainties has also accelerated the emergence of intersectional solidarities among communities confronting different forms of structural exclusion.

 

Open Political Assertion by Dalit and Adivasi Leadership

A defining feature of the current political moment is that Dalit and Adivasi leadership in Kerala has increasingly begun to openly assert political positions in the public sphere. Discussions around leaders such as Sunny M. Kapicadu, C. K. Janu, and Manikuttan as potential or symbolic candidates in Kerala elections reflected an important democratic shift. The significance of these discussions lay not only in electoral arithmetic, but also in the broader recognition that historically oppressed communities now expect direct political participation and negotiated representation. Similarly, public declarations of support for the UDF by intellectuals and activists representing 52 organisations and networks, including the press conferences of Geethanandan and Ambujakshan, reflected a new political culture. This demonstrated that the leaders representing the historically oppressed communities were increasingly willing to negotiate alliances publicly.

This marks a departure from older political expectations, where historically oppressed communities were often expected to remain within broader secular or class-based coalitions without independently articulating political positions. Increasingly, intersectional solidarity is becoming the basis for new political alliances and democratic negotiations in Kerala.

 

Intellectual Assertion and Intersectional Solidarity

The recent transformations in Kerala cannot be understood only through elections. The state has also witnessed the rise of a strong generation of Dalit and Adivasi intellectuals, writers, filmmakers, journalists and public scholars who have reshaped democratic discourse. Intellectuals such as Sunny M. Kapicadu have consistently challenged caste invisibilization within Kerala’s progressive discourse while raising questions of constitutional morality, burial rights, land inequality and dignity. C. K. Janu’s long-standing struggles around Adivasi land rights and displacement continue to shape debates on indigenous justice.

Public intellectuals and scholars, including Dinu Veyil, Dhanya Raman, Rekha Raj, Vinil Paul, Syamkumar, Malavika Binny and many others, have contributed through academic research, anti-caste writing, feminist critique and public engagement. Mainstream media interventions by Rejimon Kuttappan, literary contributions by Dalit and Adivasi poets and writers, including Vedan and cinematic interventions by Dr. Biju, Mrudula Devi, Vinayakan and Leela Santhosh and many more, show how questions of caste, labour, ecological vulnerability and democratic exclusion are increasingly entering Kerala’s public sphere through multiple platforms. One important political framework emerging from these interventions is intersectional solidarity.

More than a slogan, intersectional solidarity is increasingly becoming a political formation through which historically oppressed communities are building collective democratic assertion across caste, labour, gender, ecological and livelihood struggles. Dalit, Adivasi, coastal, feminist, labour and climate-vulnerable communities are increasingly recognizing shared experiences of exclusion while also acknowledging the specificity of caste oppression. Grassroots women leaders such as Gomathi Akka, representing plantation labour women from Idukki; Maglin Philomina, from the fishing community in Thiruvananthapuram; and Ammini K, Adivasi women leader from Wayanad reflect this transformation. Their experiences reveal the intersection of caste, labour exploitation, gender inequality, climate vulnerability and livelihood insecurity. Similarly, the 266-day protest by ASHA workers in Kerala reflected growing anger over low wages and the contradictions within the state’s celebrated public health model, helping build solidarities that extended beyond conventional political and social camps.

The emergence of intersectional solidarity has also been shaped by institutional struggles and public resistance against caste oppression within Kerala’s educational and cultural spaces. Protests and mobilizations around caste discrimination at the K. R. Narayanan National Institute of Visual Science and Arts, caste exclusion within campuses and universities, atrocities against historically oppressed communities and allegations of extrajudicial aggression have contributed to a broader political consciousness among youth and social movements. Historically oppressed communities increasingly responded through protests, demonstrations, public campaigns and collective resistance. These struggles helped make caste violence, institutional discrimination and state accountability central concerns within Kerala’s democratic discourse.

 

Elections, Representation and the Future of Kerala Politics

The recent elections also revealed a deeper crisis within Kerala’s traditional bipolar political structure. The BJP’s growing vote share, reportedly reaching around 15.18% in certain contexts, reflects not only ideological polarization but also the fragmentation of older welfare-based political coalitions. Economic insecurity, youth unemployment, migration anxieties, agrarian distress and dissatisfaction with established political structures have created conditions for alternative political mobilizations. Historically oppressed communities are no longer electorally peripheral; they are becoming strategically central to Kerala’s political future.

These shifts have also complicated the UDF’s traditional social base, historically associated with sections of upper-caste and Christian communities. As the BJP attempts to expand its influence within these constituencies, the UDF is increasingly being positioned as a broader anti-BJP coalition at the state level, particularly because of the continued presence of the Muslim League within the alliance. For many supporters, this regional electoral arithmetic is also tied to a larger national calculation that strengthening the Congress-led opposition within state legislatures remains necessary to counter the BJP nationally.

At the same time, questions of representation have become increasingly important in the context of the formation of the UDF ministry. The inclusion of three Dalit MLAs as ministers is viewed by many as politically significant because it reflects growing pressure from historically oppressed communities for meaningful participation in governance and institutional power. It also suggests that mainstream political formations increasingly recognize the electoral and political importance of Dalit assertion within Kerala’s changing democratic landscape. However, the continued absence of Adivasi representation within the ministry remains deeply disappointing. In a state where Adivasi communities continue to face land insecurity, displacement, ecological vulnerability and inadequate rehabilitation, the lack of ministerial representation reinforces the long-standing invisibilization of indigenous communities within institutional power.

This contradiction reveals a deeper political economy reality within Kerala society. As historically oppressed communities increasingly build intersectional solidarities and engage more directly with questions of governance, development, representation and resource distribution, dominant social and political interests increasingly perceive this emerging unity as a challenge to existing power structures. The growing assertion of Dalit, Adivasi, coastal, plantation labour and other historically oppressed communities is therefore not merely an electoral development. It is increasingly shaped through solidarities across communities that were historically treated as separate social and political constituencies. This reflects a deeper democratization of political participation, where historically excluded communities are demanding a role in shaping policy, development priorities and governance itself. The central political question facing Kerala today is whether democratic institutions are capable of moving beyond symbolic inclusion toward structural participation and justice.

 

Conclusion

The recent electoral shifts in Kerala represent more than temporary political dissatisfaction. They reflect a deeper restructuring of democratic consciousness within the state’s political economy. Historically oppressed communities are engaging with politics through questions of land, labour, ecology, dignity, climate justice, rehabilitation and democratic participation, rather than functioning as permanent vote banks for any political formation. The growing visibility of Dalit and Adivasi intellectuals, grassroots leaders, journalists, filmmakers and activists reflects how historically oppressed communities are producing their own political narratives instead of depending on representation through dominant structures.

The future of Kerala politics may depend on how political parties respond to demands emerging from historically oppressed communities. The consolidation of intersectional solidarity among these communities may become one of the defining political developments shaping Kerala’s democratic future. What is unfolding in Kerala is therefore not simply a shift in voting behaviour. It represents the emergence of a new democratic phase in which historically oppressed communities are actively reshaping the political economy of the state.

 

Jinu Sam Jacob belongs to the Dalit community and is a social development practitioner with 18 years of experience working on human rights, climate justice, governance, urban poverty within and outside India. He has worked with organizations including Plan International, Save the Children, CRY and IIHS. Currently, he is based out of Bengaluru and working as Consultant for development Organisations, CSRs and Philanthropists. He is co-ordinating Alliance of Climate Frontline Communities and engaging in international advocacy with UNFCCC. He is also an advisor for the South Asian Sanitary Labour Network.

Everything and Nothing All At Once: New Post-Ideological Shifts in Tamil Nadu

You are most likely to understand Vijay’s Tamizhaga Vetri Kazhagam (TVK) if you have had a friend who is a people pleaser. At Vijay’s first maanadu (political conference) in 2024, soon after the launch of his party, it was revealed that the five figures whose ideologies were going to guide TVK’s ways were Ambedkar, Periyar, Kamaraj, Anjalai Ammal and Velu Nachiyar; a confusing bunch and a perfect example of too many cooks spoiling the broth. What they all have in common, except broadly overlapping progressive leanings and four out of five of them living around the same time, is beyond me. This was perhaps the earliest public hint of a personality that wants to cover all his bases and make everybody happy.

The logical conclusion of aiming for universal appeal is the strange cocktail that is Vijay’s cabinet. We have CTR Nirmal Kumar, who is TVK’s Deputy General Secretary (IT and Social Media Wing) and the Minister of Energy Resources and Law, who previously served as the President of the State IT and Social Media Wing of the BJP between 2019 and 2023. He has/continues to have affiliations with the RSS and was very strategically (rather cunningly) made to contest in the Thiruparankundram Assembly Constituency, where the centuries-old conflict between a temple and a dargah in close proximity escalated last year into full-blown communal riots. The conflict is likely to resurface in November 2026 during the annual festival of lights (Karthigai Deepam), when the Hindus will once again ask that their deepam be lit 50 metres away from the dargah. And Nirmal Kumar, as the MLA of the constituency, will oversee it all.

The party’s treasurer and Minister for Food and Civil Supplies, P. Venkataramanan, is a Brahmin candidate fielded in the constituency synonymous with Brahminism itself – Mylapore. He has famously called anti-Brahminism an “old ideology” that “does not exist now” and is “not necessary in today’s society”. Beyond the venom in his words lies some valid grouse with a century-old anti-caste movement that is solely concerned with anti-Brahminism. It is evidence of no real or meaningful effort at caste eradication by any of the Dravidian parties at the helm of power for 60+ years. Even within the last 5 years of M.K. Stalin’s reign, the murder of Dalit men in cases of inter-caste marriages, the murder of K. Armstrong – the state President of the Bahujan Samaj Party; and, where caste and labour are intrinsically linked, the sanitation workers’ protest and the Samsung workers’ strike, were not handled by the DMK with the same care they use to craft their words. That both DMK and AIADMK consistently reduce their voters to their caste identity every election cycle, with their adamance about only allowing every region’s oppressor-caste candidates to contest in their respective constituencies, is an open secret. Unsurprisingly, the one group that is unanimously and vocally happy about TVK’s victory are the Brahmins.

The foundation of people-pleasing is deliberately allowing many different meanings to be read onto you. So Vijay’s cabinet also has someone like Aadhav Arjuna, the Minister for Public Works and Sports Development, who was briefly the Deputy General Secretary of a party as strong in its Dalit liberation ideology as the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK), formerly known as the Dalit Panthers of India. Ex-YouTuber Rajmohan, the state’s Education Minister, was sworn in along with 4 women, 7 Christian, 1 Muslim and 6 other Dalit ministers, making the cabinet one with the highest number of Dalit ministers in the state so far. It is unsurprising that Vijay’s anti-casteness is accepted without much scrutiny when he has openly campaigned with the photos of Dr. Ambedkar and visited the statues of Periyar and Iyothee Thaasar after coming to power. The support of prominent figures in the anti-caste movement, such as Pa. Ranjith, only helps this narrative spread liberally. But if we are to believe the support from all sides, then we have on our hands an anti-caste party that makes Dalit people and Brahmins equally happy.

TVK is a party that is willing, nay, eager to collaborate with the BJP government. Vijay’s first official statement after being declared victorious responded to Modi’s congratulations. When the governor repeatedly delayed inviting him to form the government, he did not unleash his anger in public, an act he seems to reserve solely for the DMK. Despite backlash at the Sanskrit Vande Maataram preceding Tamil Thai Vaazhthu at his swearing-in ceremony, he repeated the sequence of events when his ministers were sworn in. The relationship between Tamil Nadu and the Union Government is strained by multiple conflicts in the realms of taxation, the Union Budget, delimitation and Keezhadi, to name a few. Vijay’s stances on all of them are unclear.

The most crucial disagreement perhaps lies in the field of education, where the state has been demanding the abolition of NEET and resisting the National Education Policy. While Raj Mohan has declared that TVK will make no compromises on the two-language policy, ABVP representatives who met Vijay on the same day as this declaration have come back with half of their demands met. People-pleasing, it turns out, is not as harmless as it looks, for it consistently sides with power when conflict emerges. At the time of writing this, Vijay has not met the press directly even once; he has perhaps realised that emulating this behaviour has no consequence.

The default Hinduism that Vijay personally subscribes to, he is unafraid to bring to the public arena. Before the election results were announced (and for some part of his campaign), Vijay was seen visiting mosques, churches and temples with a secularism that took the tone of one eager to ease Hindu anxieties. Joseph Vijay, the first Christian Chief Minister and first chief minister from a religious minority in Tamil Nadu, is constantly seen wearing an arakaja pottu, a marker that cannot be read as anything but Hindu. On his second day in office, he appointed his personal astrologer, Rickey Pandit, as his Officer on Special Duty, proof of his complete disconnection from any sense of rationalism, a move he was made to retract within 24 hours in the face of harsh criticism on the assembly floor.

Despite its history with atheism and rationalism, Tamil Nadu continues to be a deeply religious place, and one needs a figure in the state that can absorb this. A decade ago, this was J. Jayalalithaa. Post her demise and the gradual dilapidation of the AIADMK, Vijay comes as a replacement. Whether this figure is a wall or a door is yet to be seen. The stakes of holding this position are obviously very different now than they were in 2016.

The BJP winning just 1 seat in 2026 compared to 4 seats in 2021 is evidence of their irrelevance in Tamil Nadu. But the rise of Hindutva is going to look very different here than it does in the rest of the country, for the overtness of the phenomenon cannot be the sole proof of its occurrence. The widespread success of films such as Amaran, Thai Kilavi and the latest Karuppu are indicative of the fact that Hindutva will be nurtured here, as long as its references are regional.

But the road against the fascism now simmering in the state is not paved by walking on eggshells. You stand against nothing when you stand for everything, and the pandering is bound to make cracks for the BJP to make its long-attempted entry. And this will be possible not because Vijay was foaming at the mouth with hate – the opposite is in fact true – but because he was too busy running an anti-caste, secular party that is willing to collaborate with the BJP and pleases Sanghis, Brahmins and everyone in between equally.

 

Kavipriya is a writer from Tamil Nadu who likes to research, read and write and is informed by anti-caste, feminist, socialist thought.