The dubious delimitation attempt under the guise of women’s reservation during the special parliamentary session of April 16–18, 2026, was packaged as a routine constitutional necessity aligned with democratic principles of equal representation. It was rightly defeated in parliament because of its vastly inequitable and politicized approach. Yet, to prevent any future such mischievous exercise, any such lop-sided, ill-defined bill must be examined for its implications for India’s deeply stratified social structure, particularly the realities of Dalits, Adivasis, and OBCs. Doing so raises profound concerns about the future of political representation, social justice, and democratic equity for these sections of society. What was being framed as a neutral, population-based recalibration of parliamentary seats risks entrenching caste inequalities unless it explicitly addresses the historical and ongoing exclusion of these communities from political representation.
Formally, delimitation rests on the principle that each vote should carry equal weight; therefore, constituencies must be periodically redrawn to reflect population changes. India’s last delimitation was based on the 2001 Census, with a freeze on seat redistribution extended until after the first census post-2026. The forthcoming exercise, therefore, is expected to rely on updated demographic data—though notably, the absence of a recent census since 2011 introduces significant ambiguity.
As per the 2011 Census, India’s population was 1.21 billion, but contemporary estimates place it at approximately 1.47 billion, leaving around 250–260 million people outside the ambit of representation – a majority of them from the Dalit Bahujan, Tribal and Adivasi communities. This gap is not merely technical; it has direct implications for communities whose demographic weight is substantial but whose political visibility remains limited.
Dalits (Scheduled Castes) constitute approximately 16.6% of India’s population, while Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes) account for about 8.6%, based on 2011 data. OBCs, though not officially enumerated in that census, were widely estimated by the Mandal Commission and are considered by subsequent studies to comprise between 40% and 52% of the population. Taken together, these groups form an overwhelming majority—often described as the Dalit-Bahujan social bloc. Yet, their numerical strength has not translated into proportional political representation, particularly at the national level. While the Constitution provides for reserved constituencies for SCs and STs in Parliament and state assemblies, these reservations are tied to outdated population data and do not extend to OBCs in Parliament.
This structural imbalance affecting DBA communities becomes more pronounced in the context of delimitation. A purely population-driven redistribution of seats is expected to increase the parliamentary weight of northern states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana and Rajasthan. These states already account for about a 33.89% share of Lok Sabha seats and projections using the 2011 census suggest that their share would rise by approximately 43.97% for a total of 48.97% in an expanded House of around 850 members (see chart 1). These numbers would further increase if the current population estimate of 1.47 billion is considered. Similar rises (see Chart 2) are indicated in states like Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha where the combined Dalit and Tribal population exceeds 40%.
Chart 1 - North Indian States
Chart 2 - Tribal Population Dense States
Superficially, these changes might appear beneficial for Dalit-Bahujan communities, given their large presence in these states. Uttar Pradesh, for instance, has one of the highest concentrations of Scheduled Castes in the country, with Dalits comprising over 21% of its population. Bihar’s OBC population is estimated to exceed 50%, while Adivasi populations are significant in states like Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan.
However, the critical issue is not merely where these populations are concentrated, but how political power is distributed within these regions. Electoral representation and outcomes in these states have historically been shaped by dominant caste coalitions, often marginalizing Dalit-Bahujan voices despite their numerical strength. The expansion of seats, therefore, risks amplifying existing patterns of dominance unless accompanied by structural safeguards ensuring equitable representation.
The absence of political reservation for OBCs in Parliament is particularly significant in this context. Despite constituting nearly half of India’s population, OBCs do not have reserved constituencies at the national level, unlike SCs and STs. This exclusion is compounded by the lack of updated caste data. The Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC) conducted in 2011 collected extensive data, but its caste findings have never been fully released or integrated into policymaking. Without a comprehensive caste census, delimitation proceeds in a data vacuum that obscures the actual social composition of constituencies. This effectively perpetuates historical inequalities, allowing representation to be recalibrated based on aggregate population figures while ignoring internal disparities.
For Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the situation is equally complex. The number of reserved constituencies is determined by their share in the population, but this share is based on outdated data. If the actual proportion of SCs and STs has changed over the past decade and a half—as is most likely—then the current framework under-represents their presence. Moreover, delimitation could alter the geographical distribution of reserved constituencies in ways that dilute the political influence of these communities.
For example, if SC populations are dispersed across multiple constituencies rather than concentrated in specific areas, the number of reserved seats may not adequately reflect their demographic weight.
Adivasi communities face additional challenges. Concentrated in forested and resource-rich regions, they have long experienced displacement, land alienation, and administrative neglect. While ST-reserved constituencies exist, they do not necessarily guarantee effective representation, particularly when political and economic power remains external to these communities. Delimitation that does not account for the socio-economic vulnerabilities of Adivasis risks reinforcing a pattern in which territorial representation exists without substantive empowerment.
The linkage of delimitation to the implementation of women’s reservation further complicates the picture. The Constitution (106th Amendment) Act, 2023, which mandates 33% reservation for women in Parliament and state assemblies, has been widely celebrated as a landmark reform. However, its implementation is contingent upon the completion of a fresh census and subsequent delimitation. This conditionality effectively delays the realization of women’s representation, potentially by several years.
For Dalit-Bahujan women, who face intersecting forms of marginalization based on caste, class, occupation and gender, this delay is particularly consequential. Without explicit provisions ensuring representation for SC, ST, and OBC women within the broader quota, there is the risk that the benefits of women’s reservation will be disproportionately captured by upper-caste women. At the same time, the government has been noted to ignore calls by Dalit transgender activists for horizontal reservation for transgender persons even as BJP has sought to introduce exclusionary amendments to the existing Transgender Act.
Data from local government institutions, where reservations for women and OBCs are already in place, provides important insights. Studies have shown that while women’s reservation in Panchayati Raj institutions has increased female participation, the distribution of benefits is uneven. In many cases, women from dominant social groups are more likely to occupy leadership positions, while Dalit and Adivasi women continue to face barriers such as social discrimination, limited access to resources, and proxy representation. Extending this pattern to Parliament without corrective measures will reproduce similar inequalities at scale.
The federal dimension of delimitation has attracted considerable attention, particularly the potential shift in political power from southern and western states to the northern Hindi belt. Southern states such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh have achieved population control, higher literacy levels, and better health outcomes compared to many northern states. Consequently, their population growth has stabilized, while their share of parliamentary seats is likely to decline in relative terms—from around 23.8% to approximately 20.2%, even if the absolute number of seats increases from 129 to 172 (see Chart 3) purely on the basis of population.
Chart 3 - South India States
While this shift is framed as a question of regional imbalance, it also has implications for Dalit-Bahujan communities. Southern states have historically implemented more robust social justice policies, including reservations for OBCs in education and employment, welfare schemes targeting marginalized communities, and relatively stronger institutional frameworks for addressing caste discrimination. A reduction in their political influence at the national level could weaken the policy emphasis on social justice, affecting the oppressed caste populations across the region.
At the same time, the expansion of representation in northern states does not automatically translate into improved outcomes for marginalized communities. These regions continue to face significant challenges in terms of poverty, education, healthcare, and social inequality. According to National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5) data, indicators such as child malnutrition, maternal mortality, and access to sanitation remain worse in several northern states compared to the national average, with Dalit-Bahujan communities disproportionately affected. Without targeted interventions, increased political representation at the state level will not lead to substantive improvements in their socio-economic status.
The method by which delimitation is being introduced further raises concerns about social justice and democratic practice. Rather than being debated as an independent issue, it has been embedded within the operational framework of women’s reservation, limiting the scope for independent and broader scrutiny. This approach mirrors a broader pattern of policymaking in which significant structural changes are introduced with limited consultation and legislative debate. For communities that have historically been excluded from decision-making processes, such methods exacerbate existing deficits in representation.
The delay in conducting the census adds another layer of social justice complexity. A census is not merely a statistical exercise; it is the foundation upon which policies related to representation, resource allocation, and social justice are built. The absence of up-to-date data undermines the credibility of the delimitation process and raises questions about its fairness toward oppressed communities. For Dalit-Bahujan communities, whose claims to representation are often contested or minimized, the lack of reliable data is particularly detrimental.
Experts have suggested alternative approaches that incorporate indicators such as fiscal contribution, socio-economic development, and human development outcomes alongside population. Such models could help balance the principle of equal caste representation with the need to ensure equitable participation of Dalit-Bahujans in governance. However, these proposals have not been considered, and the insistence on a purely population-based approach that suggests a preference for a framework that aligns with existing political advantages of dominant communities.
Ultimately, delimitation is not just a technical exercise; it is a reconfiguration of the political landscape that will shape distribution of power for decades. For the broader Dalit-Bahujan population, the stakes are particularly high. Without explicit safeguards, updated data, and inclusive policymaking, the process risks reinforcing the very inequalities it should seek to address.
Democracy, at its core, is about ensuring that those who have historically been excluded are meaningfully included in decision-making. A delimitation process that prioritizes numerical redistribution without addressing structural inequities falls short of this ideal. In its current form, it risks transforming demographic strength into political invisibility, leaving Dalit-Bahujan communities as passive participants in a system that continues to marginalize their voices and political equality.
The question, therefore, is not whether delimitation should occur, but how it should be conducted. A just and equitable process must begin with a comprehensive caste census, ensuring that the social composition of the population is accurately reflected. It must include provisions for OBC political representation, recognizing their demographic significance. It must update and strengthen SC/ST reservations based on current data, ensuring that these communities are neither underrepresented nor misrepresented. It must incorporate intersectional safeguards to ensure that Dalit-Bahujan women are not excluded from the benefits of gender-based reservation. And above all, it must be conducted through a transparent, consultative process that includes the voices of those most affected.
Without these measures, delimitation risks becoming an instrument of consolidation for the dominant castes rather than democratization—a mechanism that redistributes seats while leaving power structures intact. For a country that has long struggled with the legacies of caste and inequality, such an outcome would represent not progress, but regression.
*Data based on analysis merging figures from Census of India 2011, Election Commission of India, Times of India and numbers in the Delimitation proposal of 131st Amendment Bill.
Oliver D’Souza is a former journalist and an author.