This is with reference to the DV edit of Jan.1, 1991 (“Hindu unity” which is now brought out as a reprint titled “Hindu unity destroying Indian unity”, DSA 1991). Anthropologist P.G. Ganguly has contributed a very important paper, entitled, “Separatism in the Indian polity”, to a book, Anthropology and Archaeology edited by M.C. Pradhan, and RD In the concluding remarks, Ganguly writes, (op. 102-105).
Apart from N. Datia-ajumdar, who did conceptualize the tribal movement as a special 2p ice movement (The Santhal ~’A study in Acculturation, 656), no one else has seen the independence aspect the tribal movement. | have analyzed the tribal movement within a model of ‘independence movement’. My outline of the perspective n which the friable movement can be a major ‘methodological island’ usually hidden — on which most attempts to understand the separatist forces operative in the Indian polity are generally wrecked.
Many students have described ‘the fundamental unity of India’ (R.K. Mukherjee— The fundamental unity of India, 1914) (JL Nehru — the Discovery of India, 1947). The historian, R. C. Majumdar, reminder us:
“The fundamental unity of India is emphasized by re Bharat-Varsha, ml of Bharata, given to the whole country – in the epics and the Puranas, and the designation Bharati Santati, or descendants of Bharata, applied to its people…. This sense of unity was ever present before the minds of the + theologians, political philosophers and poets who spoke of the ‘thousand yojanas (leagues) of land that stretch from the Himalaya the year, sat he proper domain of a single universal ‘emperor’ and eulogized monarchs who south extend their sway from the snowy mountain in the north to Adam’s bridge in the south and from the valley of the Brahmaputra in the east to the land beyond the seven mouths of Indus in the west”(an advanced history of India 1948)
Students of Indian history however, are also familiar with the view— stated so oftener n so many ways —— that India is not one country, Ut many countries, containing not one people, but many peoples. Sir John Seeley said that “India is a mere goof graphical expression, like Europe and Africa. (The Expansion of England, 1883, pg. 92). The implication is obvious: India is not a nation. J. Strachey pulled no punches when he wrote that there is not and never was an India, no Indian nation, no “people of India (India: list Administration and Progress, 1988). S. Harrison said that the unity of India was based on tenuous foundations, foundations perpetually inclined to disintegrate (India: The Most Dangerous Decades, 1960).
Those who propound the unity of India as a reality argue from facts. The practicing politicians, too, not only argue from facts but also use them in their competition for power over men and resource.
If facts can simultaneously prove and disprove the _ unity of India, these obviously room for thought.
Cultural unity — an elite ideology: The unity in Dalit Voice Can force the two nationalities united? (Baldev Singh, President, Sant Kutiya Gurdwara, Calcutta) India, in so far as it exists, is cultural unity. But is it meaningful for talk even in terms of cultural unity of India? Is it not cultural uniformity — mere uniformity — that we have in mind? The regional variations are too glaring and pressing to be ignored. Is it not likely that the so-called cultural unity — or uniformity — is more an ideology (D.E. Apter — Ideology and Discontent, 1964, pg. 16-18) than a set of observable elements of social action? Majumdar’s reference to the fact that the ‘fundamental unity of India, as perceived by the theologians, political philosophers and poets, would suggest that this unity was an elite ideology. Sentimentalism apart, was this not an elite ideology even during the anti-British movement? Does not the decline of this ideology in contemporary India indicate the incontrovertible decline of those who were the elite during the anti-British movement and for a decade and a half after that? If this is likely, the whole question of India’s unity needs systematic sociological scrutiny. No one can deny that culturally the people of India display certain similarities. Observably, these similarities are in some of their customs and practices and in some of their beliefs, which the people who know the word ‘religious describe as religious beliefs. But such seminaries did not prevent in the past — as they do not today — numerous manifestations of inbuilt separatism. Men do not live by cultural similarities alone.
Crucial question: The American settlers and the British, on the whole, were culturally similar, and yet the settlers fought the war of independence. The fact that many in Hitlers Germany were Christian did not stand in the way of German invasion of Poland, a country which was inhabited by both Jews and Christians. The fact that many Bantus in South Africa are Christian does not dissuade the white Christians from practicing apartheid. Similarly, the fact that the Brahmin and the ‘warrior caste’ landlords (Kshatriyas) and moneylenders (Vaishyas) were Hindu, as presumably some Munda’s were, did not deter them from annexing the Mundari land. Decidedly, if our interest is to understand the phenomena of the Second World War, Apartheid or the Munda independence movement, it is pointltoe sharps on cultural similarities between the victim and victor. Numerous examples of this kind can be given from all periods of world history. All of them suggest, in my view, that practically nothing can be deduced about inter-group relations, – particularly, power relations, if we begin analysis via the concept of culture. The crucial questions to be asked in this context are: who can compel whom, when, in which respect and how?
I am grateful to Mrs. Surinder Kaur for finding out this most important book.
